THE NEW REPUBLIC

VERMONT

These New Men

Some of the shrewdest political observers have been struck, if not bowled over, by the drama of the "new men" taking command of the Democratic Party. It is not simply that the youthful Mr. Kennedy has won the Presidential nomination; it is that he has done it largely on his terms, through his own efforts and the efforts of men of his own generation; he is not the candidate because of his religion, or because of labor or ADA, or because of the old pros, or because of a single region. "1960," Walter Lippmann believes, "marks the passing of the old political generation and the appearance of the new." "A new kind of party is coming into being," Marquis Childs writes, "under the sponsorship of new men." Ralph McGill says that "an old political order is passing. . . . The Old Guard of the Democratic Party is finished." James Reston reports that there has been a "shift in power from men born in the 19th Century to the new generation born in the 20th, and from a very few all-powerful political bosses to a much larger group of younger and more intelligent political figures, many of them comparative amateurs." And The Economist *of London, in a lead editorial of July 9 entitled "The New Men," suggests that "it should not necessarily be a cause for anxiety among America's allies if the [nation's] choice should in fact fall on a young man. . . . Many of his most important dealings, from the very beginning of his term, will be with leaders of new states whose inexperience may be apparent but whose youthful enthusiasms have to be grasped and understood. . . . The need is for a President who will allow new ideas to reach the top and circulate effectively among the policy-makers." The transition was inevitable, if not in 1960 then four years hence, but what does it signify? What kind of a new Democratic Party may emerge, to whom is it appealing, and what is its principal* (Continued on page 3)

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

The Big Moments

★ The first big moment at the Democratic Convention was the Johnson-Kennedy confrontation scene in the crystal-chandeliered grand ballroom of the Biltmore Hotel. It was conducted with the surface politeness of a court duel and the underlying emotions of a West Side rumble. Johnson challenged Kennedy to public debate, apparently expecting to blast the young man right out of the water, and Kennedy surprisingly took the dare although he had everything to lose. What followed was a raw test of nerve of two of the fastest men on the draw in American politics. Nobody who jammed into that immense gilt and mirrored room (with TV cameras poking out like machine guns from every curve in the undulating gallery) will ever forget it. Kennedy combined a vigorous appeal with a light evasiveness and some who had not seen the young man before came away mildly surprised.

Another memorable scene was on the grass in the gloaming in the Memorial Coliseum as the day's heat turned into cool night. With Californian abruptness, Kennedy made his terse acceptance speech. Kennedy must still learn to talk slower, to improve his timing for applause; and he fluffed one fine line, "I appeal to their pride, not their pocketbook." But for all that, it was stirring. Some day, the White House may wear a bronze plaque: "Dwight Eisenhower slept here."

But here in the gathering darkness, as one battery after another of night baseball lights came on and as finally even the hovering photographer's helicopter went away, was a young man offering positive leadership and Presidential power used to the uttermost.

A third scene was anti-climax, perhaps, but we found it fascinating: it was the ancient kiss-and-make-up rite of victor and vanquished performed at a semi-private breakfast before well-heeled Democratic contributors. Adlai was there, always with his suave quip ("TR said, 'talk softly and carry a big stick' " but today the phrase is, 'don't talk while I'm putting'."). Lyndon was there, trying to put a smile over a heartbreak as he offered left over "LBJ" campaign buttons with a new motto "Let's back Jack." (We would have sworn his voice broke as he said it.) Lyndon's backer, Sam Rayburn, touched the grim joviality of the affair most perfectly when he asked where Jack had been keeping his father. (For the whole convention multi-millionaire Kennedy was kept tactfully out of sight.) "Where's old Joe," demanded old Sam? "Well, I don't know, but he's around here in the bushes somewhere – we felt his power, we who backed another candidate."

Like half-suspicious clans that have united to attack a third, many a chuckle came at the irony of the warriors' love feast. Kennedy himself touched on it, but even here he was only briefly diverted from his major theme of vigorous, all-out attack. We trust we take a properly reserved view of the young man, but here again he seemed to us to strike deftly the right note.

Just Another Hoax?

★ This reconciliation breakfast and Johnson's selection for second place really go to the heart of things. Was this convention just another hoax on gullible liberals? Do the radical professions in the Democratic platform really mean nothing?

Well, it comes down to an interpretation of Kennedy's character. Platforms, however liberal, mean little; Vice Presidents, however conservative, mean little, compared to the importance of the all-powerful American President. Johnson's selection was an opportunistic – "cynical" if you like – example of an American political tradition. This balance is supposed to strengthen the party. It must be said in fairness that the catch-all American political coalitions that are called "parties," whose purpose is to channel power, do by their very amorphousness help to prevent class, sectional and racial schisms. Famous political scientists say that sharper party differences would split the country.

Symbol of the 86th Congress

★ Yet when this is all said, we think the Northern Democrats pay too high a price for their alliance with the South. Johnson has been the symbol of this association in the bitterly disappointing 86th Congress. (Maybe he will become more active in his new role, in the three-week August "Rump" session.)

Those of us who swallow hard at Johnson's selection are called "ultra-liberals," even James Reston refers to the "extreme Democratic liberals" who wanted to try to win the election "without the South." Well, we are an ultra-liberal if it means thinking that 100 years is too long to wait to give Negroes the vote, or that a minority in Congress should not tyrannize a majority. Things are relative. Of course Johnson wants a faster rate of progress than the South; we want a faster rate of progress than Johnson. But his nomination fogs the issue. Of one thing we are certain anyway; constant and unremitting pressure on the South is essential. There is some evidence that it is already pushing the stubborn clock ahead a little.

Why Johnson took the role is hard to figure; if he thinks he can run the Senate from the presiding officer's chair, we believe he is mistaken. The choice puts nearly irresistible pressure on Rockefeller to take second place.

Democrats have now endorsed what Nixon sneeringly called "growthmanship," a clear-cut economic issue that could last a generation. It will be a fierce campaign, we believe, with the new Nixon starting lofty and aloof and gradually reverting to old Nick.

Pearls on the Arena Floor

★ "I don't ever get down to counting votes" – LBJ, July 3. "Robert Kennedy stated that I was his personal choice for Vice President" – Sen. Henry Jackson, July 5. "This man is a God-fearing Christian . . . he knows that many civil rights bills are Communist inspired" – nominating speech for Governor Barnett of Mississippi, July 6. "They're divine, all of them" – Eunice Kennedy, when it was all over.

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THE WEEK

1. These New Men; LBJ – Half the Way; Expensive Money; Briefing the Candidates; How Bowles Did It; Collapse in the Congo; Sugar and Politics; Had Bevan Lived

ARTICLES

10. The Superficial Aspect by Gerald W. Johnson
11. China's Revolutionary Mission by Denis Warner
14. Keeping a Lid on Farm Production by Lauren K. Soth
15. Growth Through Taxation by James Tobin
19. Walter Lippmann – An Interview by Howard K. Smith

DEPARTMENTS

25. Books 28. Art 29. Movies
30. Television 30. Correspondence

THE STAFF

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These New Men

. . . business? The New Guard speaks to the voter who has come of political age since World War II; theirs is the party of coffee-hours in living rooms, of television, of the kind of precinct organization that can be staffed by housewives – a party most of whose members are literate, high-school and college graduates, sophisticated and reasonably well-off. For them, windbag oratory or the spectacle of the torch-light parade have charm only as curiosities. For them, the social services of the old-time party organization are and should be provided out of taxes. Instead of a basket of groceries, they expect from their politicians action on unemployment, depressed areas, transportation, social security and medical care.

The leaders of this new party are not all devotees of Senator Kennedy's nomination – Eugene McCarthy is a shining example of that – but they are of his age, few of them are creatures of long-established political machines, they see eye to eye on the role of 20th Century government, they accept without regret involvement of this country in what happens on every continent. It is nonsense, of course, to say that Mr. Kennedy lacks "experience." He is one of the most experienced politicians of the day, not only in the tactics of battle but in his understanding of what the battle is all about. And as for the world, he is closer in touch with realities overseas than either Mr. Truman or General Eisenhower dreamed of being when they stepped into the White House. Senator Kennedy and those who are his closest allies take it for granted that the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" issues has lost meaning; they perceive the connections between what is done here and events abroad. They sense too that this century will not, as some thought 20 years ago, be an "American Century," and that the world will not be shaped in the image of our democratic capitalism. Implicit in the platform these men wrote in Los Angeles and in the speeches of Senator Kennedy is an awareness that we can no longer assume the indefinite continuance of the bipolar conflict in the form in which it has been familiar during the past 15 years – or its end in "victory" for one side or the other.

But these new men, so eager to take over, have some mountains to climb and some rapids to swim before they can reach their destination – effective control of the party, especially in the Congress. "It is not only what we have inherited from our fathers that exists again in us," Ibsen remarks, "but all sorts of old dead ideas and all kinds of old dead beliefs and things of that kind. They are not actually alive in us; but there they are dormant all the same, and we can never be rid of them. Whenever I take up a newspaper and read it, I fancy I see ghosts creeping between the lines." If only they were ghosts! The progressive newer leaders will be haunted by flesh-and-blood committee chairmen

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in the Congress, notably in the House Rules Committee.

Can these "more intelligent political figures," as Mr. Reston calls them, win effective control of Democratic politics? Senator Johnson has been kicked upstairs, and if the ticket wins in November there will be a new Majority Leader in the Senate – one, presumably, with whom the President is compatible. Mr. Rayburn's retirement cannot be far off, which could mean the selection of a Kennedy-stripe Congressman, such as Richard Bolling, for the Speakership. This, of course, is conjecture. It is far too early to say who will come to the top, or when. But the responsibilities of the newer generation are identifiable. Nuclear energy, missiles, earth-circling satellites, for example, have made rubbish of many orthodox doctrines of defense and call in question both the utility of many of our overseas bases and the character of our alliances. Henceforth no diplomatic or military policy will have force unless it rests not merely on the consent of the governed here, but on the full consent and confidence of public opinion in a very large and growing number of non-Communist nations. How much we trade, with whom, how much of what we give of our productive skills or resources, to whom and under what conditions – cannot henceforth be settled solely by Congressional committees. Improved living standards and political stability in Asia, Africa and Latin America will mean more, not less, collective effort; more, not less, international cooperation.

The "new men" aren't starting from scratch. America for years has been burgeoning, not only with challenges to our capacities and our compassion, but with blueprints on how to progress more rapidly. What has been missing is will, imagination, an experimental spirit at the top. Our 179.3 million population of today will, within five years, have gone up by another 15 to 20 million. A Rockefeller Report foresees a doubling of the costs of public elementary and secondary school education in the sixties – and that bill must be paid for by higher taxes, or a larger Gross National Product, or a different allocation of resources – or all three. The nation must have soon not only more and better schools and teachers, but more hospitals and clinics, nursing homes, medical schools, research facilities.

In particular, there must be made available through social security services by which the growing population of older people can be assured of adequate health care, remembering that about three-fifths of the aged who are not in institutions still have cash incomes of under $1,000 a year and that we must anticipate, by 1975, 21 million Americans over 65. We need not only more lower and middle-income housing, but a more sensible and attractive planning of the communities where they are built. It will take years to rid our cities of slums, the tangle of traffic, the foul air urban residents now breathe. The retirement of more and more families from farming must be anticipated as more food and fiber is produced on less and less land.

And why not a Taste Cultivation Program? TV's unadventurous "adventures," its nerveless dramas, its constricted wails in echo chambers that pass for popular folk music; the endless hokum of advertising, the selling short of the best in this creative country by pitching all appeals to the largest number of potential consumers – all this is as inappropriate to the 1960's as is Eisenhower's notion that business is the most reliable custodian of our national well-being.

Above all, if the "new men" are to offer something more than new faces, they must have a commitment to the widest possibilities of life. The dry rot that eats away at morale is the uncertainty in the minds of so many now coming to maturity whether there is a socially useful role for them. "The chief moral failing of Americans in the Fifties," William Lee Miller wrote in a recent issue of *Christianity and Crisis*, "was not that in a complicated new organizational world some of us could not be individually honest, but rather that more of us could not be socially responsible." Security and the obscurity of a slot in a corporation's table of organization is not the dream of the best young Americans.

We share the sense of great-things-in-the-making. We are impressed by the idealism of such men as Eugene McCarthy, Orville Freeman, Gaylord Nelson, Leroy Collins, Mennen Williams, Gale McGee, George McGovern, Lee Metcalf, Frank Coffin, Stewart Udall, Richard Bolling, Chester Bowles, John Brademas, Sidney Yates, Frank Thompson, Hubert Humphrey, and scores of others. It is not an idealism that expends itself in moral pronouncements. These men are not romantics; they find no satisfaction in defeat. Politics to them is more of a business than a game. They are untouched by the sentimentalities of the thirties about the character of Communism, but also less inhibited than the Old Guard by the Cold War rules drafted in the Stalinist forties and early fifties. They all have a controlled impatience; they want action, but they calculate the odds. They will use the power of government to expand and strengthen the economy, provide more social services, reconcile our defense policies with the new technological and political realities, and invest as we have never invested before both money and hope in nations born since 1945.

These new men know the score. And a large number of them know too that, in John Buchan's words, "in the greater matters of life, the mind must fling itself forward beyond its data," and that the possession of this instinct is what constitutes "the difference between the great and the less great among mankind."

There is a "new frontier," as Senator Kennedy said in his acceptance speech, unlimited by national frontiers, unenclosed by the space above us, unapproachable by narrow paths of the past – but there for discovery and mastery by those who have the requisite intelligence, courage and imagination.

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LBJ - Half the Way

If any doubt existed of John Kennedy's self-confidence, his choice of Lyndon Johnson as a running-mate should remove it for good. Commentators, including us, opined that political realities dictated a Vice Presidential nominee who would gladden the hearts of progressives in the big cities, as well as Midwestern farmers. Senator Kennedy decided to bear that total burden himself (no doubt in the belief that people vote only for President in any case) and use the Vice Presidency as a way of averting what might have been a vexing problem for him as candidate or as President – the presence in the legislative driver's seat both this August and next January of a proud, defeated and possibly vindictive rival, Senator Johnson.

By binding Johnson to him with hoops of steel, Kennedy has had the imagination to come to grips with something that frustrated Franklin Roosevelt for years – the constant necessity of cajoling and maneuvering around an unsympathetic leadership in Congress. In addition, he can turn the Great Persuader to the exceedingly delicate task of heading off an electoral revolt in Southern states which are alarmed by the bold civil rights plank.

By changing Lyndon Johnson from a Texas to a national politician, Kennedy frees him to take more liberal positions if, as Johnson's old friends in Washington have always vowed, those are the true beliefs of the inner man. But whether or not this happens, his skill in handling the Congress would be dedicated to making a Kennedy Administration look good, without having to think first whether a particular action was good for LBJ of Texas.

And the presence of Senator Johnson on the ticket provides other than geographic balance: the party's financial balance will be improved by the availability of Texas money. Also, the balance between the interests of oil and gas and the interests of labor and Negro groups, while it caused hard swallowing in many quarters and positive choking in some, is a reply to the charge that the Democratic Party is either anti-Southern or else it is the captive of the AFL-CIO or the NAACP.

For Johnson, of course, accepting second place amounts to a free throw. If he wins, he can still exercise force in the Senate through personality and habit of command. In addition, he will have a voice in Cabinet and National Security Council meetings. Protocol will bring him and his women folk the pleasures and prestige of diplomatic status. If the ticket loses, Johnson will still be Senator from Texas and Majority Leader because he had the foresight to have Texas law changed so that he could run for two offices at once. Few men ever had it so good.

Expensive Money

The Eisenhower Era has been a period of high interest rates, justified in the opinion of its sponsors, by the necessity to restrain inflationary pressures and promote price stability. When money is scarce and expensive, the argument runs, borrowing diminishes, demand declines, and prices stop soaring. But even if administered pricing practiced by industries did not cast doubt on this excessively simple proposition, other realities do.

Interest rates are a cost to anyone who must borrow. For the borrower, one important price – the price of money – goes up when the Federal Reserve System increases interest rates. On whom does the weight of this higher price press most heavily? The public authorities. According to calculations in a recent Conference on Economic Progress pamphlet, *Tight Money and Rising Interest Rates*, the cost of servicing the federal debt has been $5 billion more during the past seven years than it would have been if 1952 interest rates had been maintained. The extra burden upon state and local budgets is of the order of half a billion dollars.

Who else has suffered? Young couples buying their own homes have encountered a 33 percent increase in interest charges on home mortgages between 1952 and 1959. If a buyer borrowed $10,000 for a period of 30

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years, his extra interest costs over the life of the mortgage would amount to $3,300.

Farmers and small businessmen have found it possible to borrow only under disadvantageous terms and at high cost. Their large competitors in the meantime have been able to draw upon withheld profits or to acquire money from life insurance companies, or banks on much less onerous terms.

In short, the Eisenhower tight money policy has transferred some $23 billion in interest payments from those with low incomes to those with high incomes. It has been one of the causes of the dangerously low rate of economic growth of the past seven years, and it has aggravated our existing misallocation of resources between public and private uses by making all public improvements much more expensive. We have fewer schools, hospitals, and housing projects now because tight money has handicapped their financing. And high interest rates have given another boost to the forces of monopoly; anything which makes the life of the small businessman harder encourages more concentration of power in the hands of his more resourceful rivals.

Opposition to high interest rates does not imply fondness for inflation. But a sound tax and expenditure policy can accomplish the same anti-inflationary purposes without the inequitable side effects of excessive reliance upon monetary policy.

Briefing the Candidates

Who decided that only the Democratic Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates personally may be briefed by the Central Intelligence Agency is undetermined, but Mr. Eisenhower's golfing companion and alter ego, James Hagerty, says from Newport that it is the President's wish. If so, perhaps the President will be asked at his next press conference whether he questions the loyalty or discretion of Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles, who had been designated by Senator Kennedy as his liaison with CIA; whether he believes these men are security risks. If he does not, then his decision is inexplicable.

Senators Kennedy and Johnson will soon be caught up in a frantic short session of Congress, after which they will be whirling about the country for 60 days campaigning. It is astonishing that the Administration should deny them the privilege of delegating to trusted emissaries the task of keeping them informed – not on routine matters covered in *The New York Times* but on matters the candidates might not know about unless they are given complete and prompt access to certain top secret information.

Mr. Eisenhower's rebuff would matter less if things were not breaking so fast in so many parts of the world. But we seem to be heading into a series of hurricanes. Indeed, our preoccupation with domestic politics may encourage the Soviet and Chinese Communists to accelerate their drive to undermine American influence in every area possible. In Latin America, in Africa and Asia, one crack-up follows another. The Communist campaign to divide the West, to isolate neutral nations, to convince allies that they invite retaliation and risk war by close ties with the US is gaining in tempo.

In these circumstances, Mr. Eisenhower's for-your-ears-only policy is not only silly fussiness, it is irresponsible. Between now and November, Senator Kennedy is obliged to do two things which may conflict. As the Democratic nominee, he must retain his freedom to attack the Administration's conduct of foreign affairs, as well as the freedom to adopt other policies should he be elected. At the same time, the dangers are so immediate and portentous that he must act in a manner which gives our enemies no advantage. The President has made it no easier.

How Bowles Did It

"Marvelous," said Senator Kennedy to Chester Bowles after the adoption of the platform in Los Angeles, "I don't see how you did it without a walk-out." What Bowles did was to get a platform unabashedly progressive on all issues and pointedly so on civil rights – using the words "Federal Employment Practices Commission" (which stick like a bone in many Southern throats), calling for injunction suits by the US attorney-general in school desegregation cases, first-step compliance everywhere with the courts' desegregation decisions by 1963 and an end to literacy tests for Negro voters.

Bowles' task was made somewhat easier, of course, by the reluctance of Senator Johnson and his supporters to have a civil rights showdown that would make it all the harder to secure Johnson's nomination. There was also Mr. Bowles' personal style; he made a point of "talking Jefferson to the South," putting the civil rights issue as often as he could in Southern traditional terms and bending over backward to be generous and courteous to Southern members of the committee. ("We've never been treated so fairly and squarely," said Sen. Spessard Holland of Florida.")

Bowles cleverly headed off rebuttal in the platform sessions after testimony before the full committee had been given by South Carolina's Governor Ernest Hollings, thereby avoiding a predictable, acrimonious debate. He also wisely placed the entire civil rights plank in the shortened television platform which was read to the delegates; the Southerners had expected most of it to be kept for the full text later; they expected somebody then to try to sneak something through without open debate. That did not happen.

The usual TV speeches were made for home con-

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sumption, such as Senator Holland's remark that the "ultra-liberal planks . . . will drive us out of the party." But the reality is that, as Harry Ashmore wrote from Los Angeles, "The South . . . has finally faced the fact that it can no longer ruin, as it discovered long ago it could no longer rule." Kennedy had the votes of 40 of the 50 Negro delegates on the first ballot – 11 of them from Michigan – and he and Johnson followed up their nominations by a frank discussion on civil rights with all of the Negro delegates and a joint pledge to fight for the platform – now and next year.

Collapse in the Congo

The decision to send a United Nations Emergency Force to the Congo involved a high degree of risk, but it is a risk which that most experienced improvisor, Dag Hammarskjold, rightfully persuaded the Security Council had to be taken. It may be that even the timely UN intervention will not be able to keep this chaotic, ill-prepared nation from becoming a major cold war battlefield but it is equally clear the United Nations, which commands almost reverential respect in Africa, is the only possible hope for saving this country from total political destruction.

The more hopeful view of Khrushchev's new role as the belligerent protector of the Congolese Government is that he hopes to create the image, as he did among the peoples of the Middle East during the Suez crisis of 1956, that he personally forced the UN to take action as a means of protecting the people from "imperialist aggression." The intent, aside from this important psychological one, is to inflame further Congolese resentment of a Belgian intervention and thus force the UN to get the Belgian troops out permanently.

It is obviously an oversimplification to say – as *Time* magazine did last week – that the Congo's 13 million people have plunged backward into a "long night" of chaos and savagery. Actually, as Tunisian Ambassador Mongi Slim pointed out at the Security Council meeting, the civilian population of the Congo has not generally been involved in the "regrettable acts" which have occurred there. It is also worth noting that the first confirmed reports of European casualties – eight so far, apparently – came only after Belgian paratroops moved in to engage the rebels. The high incidence of rape was in part the result of heavy drinking on the part of troops, but it also must be recognized that some irresponsible politicians had led many Congolese to believe that independence would mean that they would inherit the jobs, the houses and the "property" of their former Belgian overlords. And in the Congolese tribal context, women are still generally regarded as property.

Although there were many dire predictions concerning the prospects for the jerry-built government

"In times of crisis, the newspapers are first with the cry: 'Let the people know the facts!' But perhaps Fact is a deity invoked by the people only in the last emergency when the easy gods of peace have failed them."

- Dorothy L. Sayers, 1941

"And Remember – If You Criticize You're Unpatriotic"

"In Mr. Khrushchev's comment to Mayor George Christopher at the San Francisco dinner he rated Mr. Stevenson 'the best among US politicians'."

– Sen. Everett McKinley Dirksen, May 23, 1960

* * *

"Fortunately, with Vice President Nixon so intimately familiar with the inner workings of our government, the American people now have an opportunity to confound Nikita Khrushchev."

– Columnist David Lawrence, July 8, 1960

* * *

"The public's clearest image of Richard Nixon is of an intense finger-waving man arguing with Nikita Khrushchev in the kitchen of the US exhibit at Moscow's Sokolniki Park in the summer of 1959; his Gallup poll soared on his return from Moscow – after which, predictably, it dropped." *– Time magazine, June 13, 1960*

"If people tell you they don't like Vice President, Nixon, tell them Nikita Khrushchev doesn't like him either."

– Mrs. R. G. Kenyon President of the California Republican Women's Federation, July 7, 1960

* * *

"So far as Mr. Khrushchev's statements are concerned, I don't believe that either party is or should be concerned about them. . . . I don't believe that either side is going to try and find an advantage in whatever his advice to both of us may be."

– President Eisenhower, July 6, 1960

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which was hastily created in the Congo after Belgium reversed itself last year and decided to grant the country early independence, these had largely to do with the lack of experience at every level in self-government and the failure of the Belgians to create any kind of trained administrative or political elite to whom power could be effectively transferred. Why did the collapse come instead at the country's most stable pillar – the proud, highly-disciplined and ably-trained force of volunteer soldiers which for more than 50 years has comprised the coagulant holding together the disparate Congo? All the evidence so far suggests that the military uprising was not directed against the government except in a most general way, and had none of the characteristics of a political revolution.

Independence imposed very special psychological pressures on the 23,000 Congolese in the ranks of this combined army-gendarmerie. While new-risen Congolese politicians moved dramatically up the social and economic ladder, the *Force Publique's* lot as independence approached was only increasingly arduous stretches of duty to contain native effervescence and to put down tribal-political squabbles in which they were often emotionally involved by filial ties. Since the April elections began, they have been on almost constant duty. There was no raise in pay, no time off to celebrate, and most galling of all, no prospect that any of the 1,006 Belgian officers who ruled them with a stern hand could be replaced by Congolese before 1962. In the army, racial lines remained strictly enforced and the atmosphere decidedly colonial.

The first steam-letting came in Leopoldville, but others soon followed as the news passed by talking drum that Prime Minister Lumumba had given in to the initial army demand that the *Force Publique* be entirely Africanized at once. Throughout the Congo, the soldiers responded to this invitation by bodily throwing out their Belgian officers and then, often drunk as well, proceeded to show their new power in a manner which threw the Belgian population into sheer panic. Some of the rebels' seemingly most illogical acts were logical in the local context. The repeated attacks on photographers stemmed from a recollection that newspaper photographs of the January, 1959, political demonstrations in Leopoldville were introduced in court as telling evidence against participants. And the bottling up of transportation outlets by the mutinous soldiers in the more recent stages of the crisis was not, apparently, a device to ravage and terrorize, but rather a desperate effort on the part of some to stop the alarming exodus of the technical backbone of the country. They had wanted the upper hand, but clearly had not anticipated that their rebellion would gut the country of *all* Europeans.

It is encouraging that the first contingent of US troops (from Ghana) was greeted by cheering Congolese. Although Major General Carl C. von Horn will have his hands full militarily in weaving his hastily-gathered collection of Ghanian, Tunisian, Guinean, Moroccan, Yugoslav and other troops into an effective force, his most demanding task will be a political one – to establish rapport with the weak, sensitive, many-headed Congolese Government. His prospects for success on this score would be much brighter if Belgian troops were to evacuate the country and leave to the UN Emergency Force the task of restoring order. Such a development would, of course, be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a victory for Mr. Khrushchev. But this again is a risk that has to be taken.

Sugar and Politics

Early in June, House Agriculture Committee Chairman Cooley's (D, N.C.) bill for a one-year extension of the existing sugar quota agreement with Cuba was reported out by a 19-14 party-line vote. It seemed likely to pass until Charles B. Hoeven (R, Iowa) introduced his own measure with the McCarthy-like comment that he "didn't know why Cooley is taking a pro-Castro position." Rep. William E. Miller (N.Y.) then chimed in for the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee: "The issue is simple. The Republican plan is anti-Castro and the Democratic program is pro-Castro. [Cooley's bill provides] a bonus for Communism."

Once the discussion had been brought down to that level all hope of diplomatic restraint vanished; as Cooley himself unhappily remarked, "nobody here is going to defend Castro." The House and Senate, with encouragement from US sugar beet growers, rushed through bills giving the President complete authority over the Cuban quota, after being warned by White House emissaries that they would be called back into special session if they adjourned before taking action; the Department of Agriculture immediately moved to halt further shipments from Cuba; and the President, with "genuine regret," unilaterally all but eliminated Cuba from the American market for the rest of the year – and did it less than two weeks after having taken our case against Cuba to the Organization of American States.

The consequences of this abrupt effort to "get tough with Castro" are already evident. All hope of salvaging the $500 million of American investment in the island is just about dead; American exports to Cuba, still running at better than $300 million a year, are bound to take a precipitous drop – and Cubans have bought more US dairy products, rice, flour, vegetable oils and other products than any country in Latin America. The Castro regime, no matter how neutralist it may wish to be, is now completely dependent on Sino-Soviet aid for survival, and Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Havana

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takes on added ominousness. A mutual defense pact between Cuba and the USSR, modelled after existing agreements between the USA and Turkey or Korea, seems quite possible and it is hard to see what action this government could take in such an eventuality. This is not the age of Monroe. Cuba is a sovereign state – as she has exasperatingly been proving; and there is a hemispheric organization of states and a United Nations to which beleaguered members can turn for moral if not material succor.

Still more disturbing are the implications of the President's statement that he was cutting the quota because the Cuban government "has committed itself to purchase substantial quantities of goods from the Soviet Union under barter arrangements." A dozen other Latin American countries have recently executed similar agreements with the USSR, and may be wondering whether the United States intends to take punitive action against them also. The Mexican Government has already gone on record against the sugar quota cut and the US-inspired boycott on oil shipments to Cuba. Influential Latin American leaders have begun to minimize the danger of direct Soviet aggression in this hemisphere, and to favor a neutralist position in the Cold War. Many of them privately sympathize with Cuba in her struggle against the *Yanqui* giant, and they are pretty clearly going to agree with Representative Cooley's original condemnation of the Hoeven bill as "an overt act of economic aggression."

As the Chairman of the Department of Economics at Cornell University, Professor Alfred E. Kahn, observed in a letter to the *New York Times:* "The suspicion will be very strong that our action was in reprisal for the Cuban Government's seizure of the Esso and Texas Company petroleum refineries. . . . As a layman I would be interested in having our Government explain how this move is expected to halt Cuba's drift toward Communism."

Had Bevan Lived

The death of Aneurin Bevan seems likely to accelerate the galloping crisis within the British Labour Party. The Movement has lost its richest personality: since Sir Winston Churchill's retirement, Bevan was the only man in Britain who could rouse a mass audience to paroxysms of anger or laughter. But this is not the only reason why the death of Nye, as he was called by friend and foe, is a serious matter. Ironically, this tempestuous character, this instinctive rebel, this man who, year after year, caused the leadership more trouble than anybody else, had come to be seen during the last months of his life as the one person who might be able to unite the Labour Party.

Opinion will always differ as to what Aneurin Bevan would have done had he lived and returned to politics a fit man. His last performance at the Party's inquest at Blackpool shortly after the General Election gives no decisive clue, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there are too many clues in the speech for guidance. There were passages in which he seemed to oppose the Gaitskell line of watering down the Party's belief in nationalization. It was also noticed that he went out of his way to single out some of Gaitskell's supporters and to rebuke them for their views.

Certainly his old playmates, who had parted from him with bitterness three years ago when he came to terms with Gaitskell, became convinced that he would eventually make a bid for the leadership if he ever recovered his health. They remembered his angry feud with Gaitskell, the temperamental incompatibility of the two men, the fundamental difference between their approach to politics and the problems of the day. Had not Nye once called Gaitskell a "desiccated adding machine"? Sooner or later, willingly or unwillingly, Nye would rebel again and challenge Gaitskell.

The hopes of his former friends rose when he appeared to seek them out after the Party's defeat at the last election. He was as provocative as ever. He would sometimes make caustic remarks about Gaitskell. He would talk about Russia's growing economic strength and draw the conclusion that nationalization was more relevant than ever. But when, emboldened by these fireworks, his old associates hinted that the time had come to assassinate their beloved leader, Nye gave them no encouragement.

From the point of view of the Labour Party it would not have really mattered a very great deal which of these alternatives Bevan had chosen. If he had remained loyal, Gaitskell's position would have been immeasurably strengthened. The Left would still have continued to roar and protest, but with Nye on the platform as large as life, the rank-and-file would have hesitated many times before joining any conspiracy against the hierarchy. On the other hand, if Nye had challenged Gaitskell – and there is little doubt that he could have brushed Gaitskell aside – the Party would have had a new leader who would both have satisfied the Left and at the same time have had enough experience and flair to have mounted a fierce and continuous attack upon the enemy. Whether Nye had remained loyal or had raised the flag of revolt, there would have been a possibility that the Movement might have become united and grown sufficiently confident to be a force again. As it is, Gaitskell is not only becoming increasingly isolated, relying on the advice of a handful of chosen intellectuals, but there is no obvious alternative to him. With Nye restored there would always have been the possibility of a new deal, a new order. The prospect now is that the crisis within the Labour Party may very well end in chaos.

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They Invested, All Right

President Eisenhower is trapped by his obsession with the theory that non-military foreign aid can and should be supplied largely, if not entirely, by private investment. Again, last week, in answering questions about a new plan to aid Latin America, he said that, "The only real investment that is going to flow into countries that will be useful to them in the long run is private investment." To encourage private investment he must demonstrate a willingness to protect private investors against robbery by political adventurers; but the squelching of political adventurers in foreign countries is aggression only to be justified by dire necessity.

The instant case is the necessity of dealing with the excessively annoying Sr. Castro. If that case involved nothing more than our relations with the island of Cuba, it would still be difficult, but very much simpler; the regrettable fact, however, is that dealing with Cuba is no more than the first step toward solving the main problem, which is the protection of our exposed flank in the Caribbean.

The establishment of Communist power anywhere in that area would be a calamity of such dimensions that it must be prevented by whatever means prove to be necessary. It is only common sense, however, to use the least expensive means that will accomplish the purpose, bearing in mind always that expense is not measurable entirely in the money laid out.

We have found by experience that an effective means of blocking the advance of Communism is to eliminate conditions favorable to its spread, chief of which are poverty, ignorance and despair in over-populated regions with meager resources. These are partially remediable by the judicious use of money, which makes money a highly efficient tool of modern diplomacy. But the tools of diplomacy can never be safely intrusted to private hands, so it must be, in the main, public money.

As regards Cuba, of course, American private investment long antedates Point Four and the modern conception of diplomacy, so application of the principle to that island is not close. Still, it fits, if loosely. If the refineries had been built with United States Government money, Mr. Herter would have had a much freer hand in dealing with Castro. But they belong to private investors and private investors must have protection if they are to continue to invest. Accordingly, Mr. Herter's hand was deprived of one strong card, to wit, a threat to dynamite the installations and get out; they are not his to blow up, and Castro knows it.

More than that, the refineries' unconditional refusal to handle Soviet oil may have been instigated by the State Department, but on its face it was the decision of the oil companies. This gives Latin America the impression that the companies were engaging in a little international diplomacy on their own initiative – needling the State Department into drastic action directly contrary to the policy of patient good-will heretofore pursued by the Eisenhower Administration.

We are now applying economic sanctions against the Castro regime. They will presumably destroy it in short order, although there is always the possibility that the Soviets will pour into Cuba a flood of gold that may prolong the resistance indefinitely. They might account it money well spent if it kept the United States in trouble for four or five years.

But even if Castro promptly collapses, what will be the effect in the rest of the Caribbean? He will have fallen before overwhelming economic power, not by exposure of the falsehoods he has told the Cuban people; hence the lesson learned by other Caribbean politicians will be "Beware of the Colossus of the North," not, as it should be, "Beware of lying to your own people!"

If Castro falls promptly, every other country in that region will know that the power that destroyed him could easily be brought to bear on any of the rest, and that the United States does not hesitate to use it when sufficiently provoked. Their natural impulse, then, will be to seek desperately and covertly some compensating force that may be brought into play to protect them against this country. At present, the only such power in existence is that of Soviet Russia.

When Roosevelt listed as the Fourth Freedom, freedom from fear, it was not altogether because fear is painful. It also inhibits wise action, sometimes even rational action; and if it operates so in English-speaking America, we may rest assured that it is equally effective in Latin-America. Economic sanctions may reduce Castro to order, but they will not reduce fear, not merely of our power, but of our ruthless use of it; and that may inhibit the wise decision by the Caribbean nations to repose their trust in our democracy rather than bargain with Russian Communism.

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China's Revolutionary Mission

The All-Out Struggle to Isolate the US

by Denis Warner

A week or two before his death in June, British Communist leader Harry Pollitt described the ideological differences of opinion between Peking and Moscow as a matter of emphasis. The Chinese were in a hurry, he said; the Russians felt they could afford to take their time. The solidarity of the bloc was not in question, nor was there any doubt as to the identity of purpose. All that remained to be decided was how far and how fast to go in speeding up the revolutionary processes designed to bring about world Socialism. In this context, what was widely regarded as the partial compromise between the Soviet and Chinese views expressed in the Bucharest communique of June 27 would be more correctly interpreted as a Chinese victory: the question of correctness, or otherwise, of Marxism-Leninism, as it relates to the inevitability of war in an historical setting filled with rockets and nuclear warheads, is abstract; the Chinese plan for bringing about the world revolution by non-peaceful, as well as peaceful, methods, which Khrushchev has now endorsed, is the very opposite. Now carrying the imprimatur of the bloc, it signals the opening of a new phase in the Cold War, a phase aimed not at the destruction of the United States but at its isolation by means which are variable but do not proscribe the use of armed force.

Unlike that phase of Chinese international endeavor which began with Liu Shao-chih's speech to the Australasian conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking on November 24, 1949, calling for armed struggle by the colonial and semi-colonial countries and ended with the Geneva Agreement and the Nehru-Chou En-lai declaration of the principles of peaceful co-existence in 1954, the current Chinese plans have developed slowly and have taken into account the realities, and the exploitable opportunities, of the international situation. Their origins go deep into the history of the Chinese revolution. They were favored, but not precipitated, by the U-2 incident; they took advantage of, but did not depend on, the failure of the Summit conference. Just as Mao Tse-tung once saw that the vast, potentially powerful and restless peasant forces of China could provide him with the means by which the militarily weak Communist forces might overcome the strong Nationalist armies, Peking now looks to the underprivileged masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America, with all their exploitable fears, to play the part of the Chinese peasant in the world revolution.

The Algerian revolt, the quickening impulse of independence in Africa, unrest in the Middle East and even Castro's success in Cuba have never been remote to Peking. For instance, Castro had scarcely arrived in Havana in January, 1949, when Chou En-lai declared: "The struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for national independence and against colonial oppression has become an irresistible torrent. The overthrow of the US-sponsored regime by the Cuban people and the angry roar raised by the people of the Congo against colonialism are indications that these struggles will continue to develop vigorously this year."

China has already played a leading part in the first Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo. During 1959 it extended these contacts, negotiated with the Algerian rebels over the sale of arms, opened an African section of its Foreign Office and started to broaden the Chinese people's horizons with mass rallies to celebrate such occasions as "Imperialists, Quit Africa Day," "Support Algeria Day," and "Support Cameroons Day."

It was not until the Kremlin began to exude the "Camp David Spirit," however, that Peking's interest in the underprivileged masses of the rest of the world could properly be said to have taken shape as an identifiable campaign. The suppression of the Tibetan revolt, the border dispute with India and the quarrel with Indonesia over the treatment of overseas Chinese were all separate from, though not necessarily in conflict with, the central theme – the isolation of the United States by means which alternate Politburo member, Lu Ting-yi, outlined on April 22 of this year as including "the legal and illegal, extra-parliamentary and parliamentary, sanguinary and bloodless, economic and political, military and ideological."

Some of these means were revealed on May 2 when the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, SOHYO and the Korean Federation of Trade Unions issued a communique in Peking which called on the workers of the three countries to support the struggles of the people in Japan and South Korea "to drive the US imperialists out of the Western Pacific and to support the African peoples' struggles to gain and pursue their national

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"When Will You Learn To Stop Smoking Peace-Pipes?"

independence." To argue whether this declaration and any other overt or covert acts by Peking contributed materially to the anti-treaty demonstrations in Tokyo is to miss the point of Peking's plan. Its object is exploitation, rather than initiation. It seeks, as Mao Tse-tung put it on May 9 after meeting a cultural delegation from Iraq and a trade delegation from Iran, "to form a broad united front and to unite all forces that can be united" in pursuit of Peking's goal to isolate the United States. As the *People's Daily* commented next day: "All struggles waged by the peoples of countries under US oppression are just struggles."

One obvious "just" struggle by which the United States can be embarrassed through an ally is the Algerian revolt. And here protestations of Sino-Algerian solidarity have recently given way to practical considerations of aid. On May 19, after talks extending over several weeks, Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Krim Belkachem, the Algerian vice premier, issued a communique in which they noted that "as long as colonialist oppressors and imperialist aggressors are not eliminated . . . genuine and permanent peace will be impossible." The communique also reported that the two parties had studied various ways to enhance friendly cooperation between Algeria and China. Just what form this cooperation will take is unclear: but Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mansoor Qadir, buttressing his appeal for a settlement on the grounds that the French stand is losing the Moslem world to the Communists, predicts that it will not be long before Chinese "volunteers" appear in Algeria.

Another Asian diplomat, who represented his country at the Togo independence day celebrations in April and subsequently went on to tour the rest of Africa, reported to his government that he had been "frightened" by what he saw: indigenous problems, errors of the colonial powers and "deep" Communist (especially Chinese) penetrations.

So great is the flow of delegations from the underdeveloped world to China these days that it is difficult to keep the score card. Some indication of their plurality was officially admitted on May 3, however, when Mao received members of no less than fourteen visiting delegations from Africa and Latin America. The flow is two-way. For instance, a Chinese trade union delegation left for Cuba on April 15; a Cuban trade union delegation arrived in Peking on April 17. Blas Roca, general-secretary of the People's Socialist Party of Cuba, who visited China at the end of April as the guest of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, brought the tidings that Castro himself needed no prodding to use the Cuban revolt as the point of departure for anti-American revolts everywhere in Latin America. In a televised speech in Peking on April 27 he said that the American imperialists were angry because Cuba had set the example for the rest of Latin America. "Since Cuba can have a sovereign revolutionary government neither at the beck and call of, nor subservient to, Washington, then why cannot Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have the same?" he asked. "Since Cuba can carry through a thorough-going land reform, develop multiple production, transform its economy and, casting aside US monopoly capital investors, proceed with its own industrialization, then why cannot Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and Peru do the same? Since Cuba can overthrow a regime of terror and dictatorship, which was armed to the teeth and had the active support of the United States and the US Military Advisory Group till the last minute before its downfall, then why cannot the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Paraguay also be liberated from similar dictatorships?"

Such expressions of opinion found ready listeners in China. The *People's Daily* (May 27) said that until American imperialism had been dealt crushing blows by the people of the whole world, until it had suffered a crushing defeat, it would never give up its ambition to dominate the globe and enslave the world's people. Four days later, at a Mongolian-Chinese friendship rally at Ulan Bator, Chou En-lai accused the United States of aggression and promised that it would be "dealt doubly powerful counterblows by the iron fist of the mighty Socialist camp." And on June 3, Liu Shao-chih, speaking at a State banquet in honor of a visiting

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delegation from Communist Albania, called on the "peoples of the world" to carry on "persistent struggles against US imperialism, to strike incessant blows against its scheming activities and to isolate it to the greatest possible extent."

This call for a united front against the United States was then repeated daily both by the press and by Chinese political leaders. In his opening address at a World Federation of Trade Unions Congress in Peking on June 6, Chou En-lai said: "Imperialist activities for wars and aggression can be smashed so long as the people of the world wage persistent and unremitting struggles against them." Next day, Liu Ning-I, President of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, told delegates: "We must stand on the battle front of the peoples of the world in their struggles against imperialism and its lackeys, and starting from this front, promote struggles, develop the international united front and isolate imperialism, US imperialism in particular, to the greatest possible extent."

Dividing wars into two categories, the just and the unjust, Liu said revolutionary war waged by colonial peoples and by the oppressed peoples of the imperialist countries for their own good was just war which had to be supported. It was entirely wrong, he said, to believe that war could be eliminated forever while imperialism still existed. The spreading of such illusions about imperialism among the peoples of all lands would lead to evil consequences of a serious nature, and in fact, it was already possible to see such consequences.

On June 10, the *People's Daily* summed up: "The current situation is entirely favorable . . . The working class and people of all countries should take advantage of this excellent situation and concentrate all their strength on defeating the forces of aggression and war headed by US imperialism."

In furtherance of this policy Peking has coined a new expression, "neo-colonialism," which is directed primarily against US aid and its recipients. It has also reverted to its earlier theme that true independence is never granted peacefully but must be won by revolution. With this twin-pronged approach it is now especially busy in Africa. Of necessity, however, China's principal impact will be felt first in the countries on its periphery. The opportunities for exploiting political trouble to the detriment of the United States remain unlimited in Japan and Korea. In Southeast Asia the expectation is that China will launch a major attack against the offshore islands to coincide with the American Presidential election campaign, and that Laos will explode as soon as the rice crop is harvested in August.

Tengku Abdul Rahman, perhaps the most determined anti-Communist among all Southeast Asian political leaders, returned to Kuala Lumpur after the Prime Ministers' conference in London so concerned by what he had learned of the likely nature of the attack against the offshore islands that he called for the immediate acceptance of both Communist China and Nationalist China by the United Nations. In the past, Rahman has held steadfast against recognizing Peking; but his view now is that the Communist attack against Quemoy will be launched in such weight that the United States will be forced either to use its nuclear deterrent or to stand by while Chiang Kai-shek loses the heart of his armed forces. In either case, the consequences would be damaging in the extreme for the entire Western position in Asia. The first would give rise to such a revulsion of feeling and such anti-Americanism that pro-American governments everywhere in the Asian area would find themselves in danger; the second would cast the gravest doubts on the security the American presence is designed to provide and swell the ranks of those who fear the consequences of acting as hosts to Western bases.

So far as Laos is concerned, the escape of Prince Souphanouvong and other members of the central committee of the Communist-oriented Neo Lao Hak Xat Party from a military camp in Vientiane was, in itself, a certain harbinger of trouble. The question here is therefore one of degree: and Chou En-lai's visit to Cambodia and North Vietnam in May, coupled with subsequent events, suggest that Indo-China's most explosive moments since the Geneva Agreement in 1954 are at hand.

At Phnom Penh, in a speech obviously designed to aggravate tensions between the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese, Chou referred to "nations of secondary importance, which in the past had suffered from colonialism, repeatedly conducting bellicose provocations." He came out firmly on Cambodia's side against South Vietnam in the dispute over the sovereignty of some small coastal islands and hinted that, in addition to moral and political support, Cambodia might expect other aid if she needed it "according to the possibilities at the time." Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who has never made a secret of his belief that Peking will eventually dominate Southeast Asia, has responded since with the most anti-American statements of his volatile career.

In North Vietnam, Chou found that a continuation of the current situation in Laos would be "dangerous," a well-established euphemism meaning that violence is about to begin. He also pledged support for North Vietnam's view that the "United States must be stopped in the strengthening of its military forces in South Vietnam." By the beginning of July demonstrators said to number a hundred thousand were in the streets of Hanoi demanding action.

As I pointed out last December, there is grave reason to doubt whether the Southeast Asian armies have the means, the knowledge or the training to cope with the politico-military warfare they are likely to meet. Here, as elsewhere, one can only await the unfolding of the Chinese plans with gloomy foreboding.

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Keeping a Lid on Farm Production

The net effect of government intervention in agriculture has been to step up production efficiency and total output. Many of the New Deal farm programs stimulate rather than restrain output. The whole soil conservation effort, including payments for liming, contouring, and drainage, plus technical assistance to farmers, has been a massive production increasing enterprise. Even the acreage limitations themselves probably have tended to increase total output. Acreage allotments on cotton, wheat and corn, for example, forced farmers into better crop rotations – more soil-building legumes especially.

But the real engine of farm surplus is the huge educational drive of the federal-state extension service, backed by the farm research system of the Department of Agriculture and the land-grant-college experiment stations. This program is coursing ahead at full speed.

If the objectives of all the federal farm programs of the last quarter century had been to increase farm production, raise farm efficiency, lower food costs for consumers, make available great reserves of grain for protection against drought or war, one could say they had been highly successful. But since the objectives were to reduce output and raise farm income, from the farmer's viewpoint government intervention has not been a howling success.

That is why many agricultural groups are beginning to think again about *production control of bushels and pounds, rather than acres.* The Department of Agriculture recently published a study indicating the probable effects on agriculture of a free market policy in the next several years. The study was made by civil service economists in the department at the request of Sen. Allen J. Ellender, chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, who asked the department to make projections of supplies and prices of important farm products for the period 1960 to 1965 – under two assumed conditions: *First,* that all production controls other than those on tobacco were removed (except that there would be 30 million acres of cropland in the soil bank); and *second,* that price supports were lowered to such levels as would permit an orderly reduction of stocks of storable farm commodities to normal over a 10-year period. That means, practically, a free market.

Under these assumptions, the economists estimated that total farm production would rise by about 20 percent and livestock production by about 25 percent. Here are some of the prices which could be expected in 1965 under the conditions of this study – corn 80 cents a bushel, as against $1.07 in 1959; wheat 90 cents as against $1.77; hogs $11.20 per hundred weight as against $14.20 and cattle $15 as against $22.

An advisory committee of land-grant-college economists calculated that net farm income would drop 30 to 40 percent by 1965 as a result of these changes in supplies and prices and higher production costs. Most of this drop in income would be suffered by the 2 million commercial farm families who sell 90 percent of the farm products which are marketed.

That isn't a very attractive prospect for agriculture. And when the farmers examine these projections and look at the trend of the last eight years, they take a more kindly view toward production restraints and government "strangleholds" than they did during the booming postwar years.

The National Farmers Organization, which began as a protest group several years ago, lately has been signing up large numbers of Midwest farmers on a platform of withholding farm products from market and bargaining for higher prices. It has conducted demonstration withholding operations on hogs, without noticeable results on market supplies or prices – but the NFO leaders are encouraged by the support they feel they have had. Even the Farm Bureau has been feeling symptoms of change. It still stands forthright with Benson against "control." But its largest state unit, the Illinois Agricultural Association, approved a resolution calling for compulsory retirement of some cropland by every farmer who receives government benefits.

Various commodity organizations, notably the National Wheat Growers Association, are advocating production and marketing control. And the Democratic omnibus farm bill in Congress would authorize commodity groups to develop supply control systems which the government would help them enforce.

In part, these are all responses of farm leaders to the outcry about government farm price supports – now running close to $2-3 billion a year. The leaders believe that programs which would reduce market supplies by limiting output – rather than by government purchase, storage and disposal – would be more acceptable to the public.

This would cut the federal farm budget, but it would not reduce the total cost of food to society. If it were successful, it would boost that total cost – and the income of farmers. But consumers would pay for their food in the market, rather than partially in taxes. And farming would begin to adopt the kind of management and discipline over supply that most other industries have perfected.

LAUREN K. SOTH

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Growth Through Taxation

by James Tobin

The overriding issue of political economy in the 1960's is how to allocate the national output. How much to private consumption? How much for private investment in plant and equipment? For government investment and public services? For national defense? For foreign aid and overseas investment? Though our productive capacity is great and is growing, the demands upon it seem to be growing even faster.

The importance of accelerating economic growth brings the question of allocation to the fore. Can we as a nation, by political decision and governmental action, increase our rate of growth? Or must the rate of growth be regarded fatalistically, the result of uncoordinated decisions and habits of millions of consumers, businessmen and governments, uncontrollable in our kind of society except by exhortation and prayer? The Communists are telling the world that they alone know how to mobilize economic resources for rapid growth. The appeal of free institutions in the underdeveloped world, and perhaps even their survival in the West, may depend on whether the Communists are right. We cannot, we need not leave the outcome to chance.

How can an increase in the rate of growth of national output be achieved? The answer is straightforward and painful. We must devote more of our current capacity to uses that increase our future capacity, and correspondingly less to other uses. The uses of current capacity that build up future productive capacity are of three major types: (1) *Investment*: replacement and expansion of the country's stock of productive capital – factories, machines, roads, trucks, school buildings, hospitals, power dams, pipelines, etc. (2) *Research*, both in basic science and in industrial application, by government, private industry and non-profit institutions, leading sooner or later to more efficient processes and new products. (3) *Education* of all kinds augmenting the skill of the future labor force. The competing uses of current capacity are: (1) *Unemployment:* failure to employ current capacity to the full, letting potential production be lost through unemployment. (2) *Consumption*, where most of our resources are engaged, providing us with the goods, services, and leisure that constitute the most luxurious standard of living the world has known.

Since 1953 the economy has been operating at an average unemployment level of 4.9 percent of the labor force, and the Administration seems to regard 5 percent as a highly satisfactory boom-time performance. A society geared to the objective of growth should keep the average unemployment rate down to 3 percent. Re-

Table 1

COMPOSITION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN CURRENT DOLLARS

	1953	1959	1965 target
		(billions of dollars)	
Potential Gross National Product (3% unemployment)	365	500 (104%)	688
Actual Gross National Product	365 (100%)	479 (100%)	688 (100%)
Private Consumption	233 (64%)	311 (65%)	390 (58%)
Government Purchases of Goods and Services	83 (23%)	98 (20%)	173 (25%)
a. Privately Produced	51 (14%)	53 (11%)	88 (13%)
b. Services of Gov't. Employees	32 (9%)	45 (9%)	85 (12%)
Gross Private Investment	50 (14%)	70 (15%)	123 (18%)
a. Plant & Equipment	36 (10%)	44 (9%)	88 (13%)
b. Increase in Inventories	– –	4 (1%)	8 (1%)
c. Residential Construction	14 (4%)	22 (5%)	27 (4%)
Net Private Foreign Investment	−1 (–)	−1 (–)	0 (0%)

Source for actual data 1953 and 1959: Economic Report of the President, 1960

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Table 2

COMPOSITION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN CONSTANT 1959 DOLLARS

	1953	1959	1965 target
		(billions of dollars)	
Potential Gross National Product (3% unemployment)	417	500 (104%)	650
Actual Gross National Product	417 (100%)	479 (100%)	650 (100%)
Private Consumption	254 (61%)	311 (65%)	390 (60%)
Government Purchase of Goods and Services	102 (24%)	98 (20%)	145 (22%)
a. Privately Produced	59 (14%)	53 (11%)	80 (12%)
b. Services of Gov't. Employees	43 (10%)	45 (9%)	65 (10%)
Gross Private Investment	60 (15%)	70 (15%)	115 (17%)
a. Plant & Equipment	44 (11%)	44 (9%)	80 (12%)
b. Increase in Inventories	1 (–)	4 (1%)	8 (1%)
c. Residential Construction	15 (4%)	22 (5%)	27 (4%)
Net Private Foreign Investment	1 (–)	–1 (–)	0 (0%)

Source for actual data 1953 and 1959: Economic Report of the President, 1960

duction of unemployment to this level could increase Gross National Product from the current labor force and capital stock by about $20 billion. *But this increase in output will contribute to economic growth only if it is used in substantial part for investment, research and education;* it will make no contribution if it is " consumed. Republican economic policies are highly vulnerable. But critics should eschew the superficial political appeal that more vigorous pursuit of full employment, with a battery of New Deal anti-depression remedies, will by itself assure rapid growth.

To stimulate growth we must somehow engineer two shifts in the composition of actual and potential national output. One is *from private consumption to the public sector* – federal, state and local. Domestic economic growth is, of course, not the only reason for such a shift. Increased defense, increased foreign aid, increased public consumption are possibly equally urgent reasons. The second shift of resources that must be engineered is *from private consumption to private investment.* About three-quarters of Gross National Product is produced with the help of business plant and equipment. Faster growth of output requires a more rapidly expanding and more up-to-date stock of plant and equipment. Every $1 increase of GNP requires in the neighborhood of $1.50 new plant and equipment investment. Thus to raise the rate of growth two percentage points, say from 3 percent to 5 percent per annum, the share of plant and equipment investment in current GNP must rise by three percentage points, *e.g.* from 10 percent to 13 percent.

Tables 1 and 2 provide a concrete illustration of the kind of change we need in the relative composition of output if we are serious about increasing our rate of growth. Table 1 shows the actual composition of GNP in 1953 and 1959, and a suggested target for 1965. Table 2 shows the composition of GNP in the three years with correction for price changes, *i.e.* in "constant 1959 dollars." Table 4 is based on Tables 1 and 2 but brings out the essential point more clearly. It shows how the actual increase in GNP between 1953 and 1959 was allocated among major uses, and, in contrast, how we should allocate the growth in output over the next six years if we really want output to grow.

Between 1953 and 1959 potential GNP rose from $365 billion to an estimated $500 billion. The composition of GNP in these years is shown in Table 1. The way in which the $135 billion increase was used is shown in the first column of Table 4. Some of the potential increase went to waste in unemployment. Of the realized increase, 69 percent went into consumption, 13 percent into government activity, and 18 percent into investment. Unfortunately these calculations *understate* the effective growth of consumption relative to government and investment. The reason is that the prices of goods and services needed for government activity and private investment rose relative to the prices of consumption goods and services. The extent of price increases for the various components of GNP is shown in Table 3. For example, the services of government employees (teachers, policemen, clerks, etc.) rose in price 34 percent while consumer prices rose 9 percent. Although we managed to increase government expenditure for such services by 13 billion, $11 billion

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of the increase was simply the higher cost of the volume of services we were already getting in 1953 and only $2 billion represented a real expansion of such services. When account is taken of this and other unfavorable relative price changes, some 92 percent of the growth in output "in constant dollars" went to consumption; *government activity actually diminished;* private investment got 16 percent of the increase in GNP, and *none of this increase was for plant and equipment.* (See column 3 of Table 4.)

Unfortunately we will probably have to continue to do some running just to stay in the same place. The target suggested for 1965 in Tables 1 and 2 assumes that prices of goods and services for investment will rise, relative to consumer prices, in the proportions shown in Table 3. If consumption prices are kept stable from 1959 to 1965, potential 1965 GNP is estimated at $688 billion. Table 1 suggests that we resolve to increase to 25 percent the government share of that output, and to 18 percent the investment share. The assumed price increases in those sectors would nullify part of those increases, leaving us a GNP of $650 billion in constant 1959 dollars, with the composition shown in Table 2. In order to keep from consuming more than 46 percent of the projected increase in real output we must restrain consumption to 38 percent of the growth of dollar output. (See Table 4.)

Policy to accelerate growth must be double-edged. On the one hand, it must stimulate the desired government and private expenditures. On the other hand, it must discourage consumption. Here are some major constituents of a program for growth:

1. Increased expenditure by federal, state, and local governments for education, basic and applied research, urban redevelopment, resource conservation and development, transportation and other public facilities.
2. Stimulus to private investment expenditures by:

   (a) Federal Reserve and Treasury policy to create and maintain "easy money" conditions, with credit readily available and interest rates low, especially in long-term capital markets.

   (b) Improvements of averaging and loss-offset provisions in taxation of corporate income, to increase the degree to which the tax collector shares the risk of investment as well as the reward.

   (c) The privilege of deducting from corporate net income for tax purposes a certain percentage of a corporation's outlays for plant and equipment to the extent that these outlays exceed a specified minimum. The specified minimum would be the sum of depreciation and (on the assumption that the tax rate is 52 percent) 48 percent of net income before tax. To qualify for the tax concession, a corporation would have to be investing more than its normal gross profits after tax. The concession, and the minimum requirement for eligibility for it, are designed to encourage greater corporate saving, the full investment of internal funds, and, most important, the undertaking of investment financed by outside saving obtained from the capital market. An analogous proposal to encourage non-corporate saving and investment is suggested below.

If these measures were adopted, a reduction in the basic corporate income tax rate, advocated by many as essential to growth, would be neither necessary nor equitable. Indeed the strength of these measures might be greater if the rate were increased.

3. Restriction of consumption, by:

   (a) Increase in personal income tax at all levels, accompanied by permission to deduct a certain amount of saving from income subject to tax. Like present deductions for charity, medical care, etc., the saving deduction would be claimed at the taxpayer's option, with the burden of proof on him. A schedule of "normal" saving for taxpayers of various incomes and family circumstances would be established, and only saving in excess of a taxpayer's "normal" would be eligible for deduction. A scheme of this kind seems the most feasible equitable way to use the tax instrument to favor saving at the expense of consumption.

   (b) Improvements in the social security system – *e.g.* raising retirement benefits and relating their amount, above a common minimum, to cumulated covered earnings – should be introduced on a quasi-contributory basis. Since the payroll tax contributions then precede the benefits, the funds accumulate and can be an important channel of national saving.

   (c) Increase in state and local taxes – property or

Table 3

PRICE INCREASES OF GNP COMPONENTS

	Actual: 1959 prices relative to 1953	Assumed: 1965 prices relative to 1959
Private Consumption	1.09	1.00
Government Purchases of Goods and Services		
a. Privately Produced	1.15	1.10
b. Services of Gov't. Employees	1.34	1.30
Gross Private Investment		
a. Plant & Equipment	1.22	1.10
b. Residential Construction	1.07	1.05

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Table 4

DISPOSITION OF INCREASES IN GNP

	Current Dollars		Constant 1959 Dollars	
	1953 to 1959	1959 to 1965	1953 to 1959	1959 to 1965
	(billions of dollars)			
Potential Gross National Product	135 (118%)	188 (90%)	83 (133%)	150 (88%)
Actual Gross National Product	114 (100%)	209 (100%)	62 (100%)	171 (100%)
Private Consumption	78 (69%)	79 (38%)	57 (92%)	79 (46%)
Government Purchases of Goods and Services	15 (13%)	75 (36%)	−4 (−7%)	47 (27%)
a. Privately Produced	2 (2%)	35 (17%)	−6 (−10%)	27 (16%)
b. Services of Gov't. Employees	13 (11%)	40 (19%)	2 (3%)	20 (11%)
Gross Private Investment	20 (18%)	55 (26%)	10 (16%)	45 (26%)
a. Plant & Equipment	8 (7%)	44 (21%)	0 (0%)	36 (21%)
b. Increase in Inventories	4 (5%)	4 (2%)	3 (5%)	4 (2%)
c. Residential Construction	8 (7%)	7 (3%)	7 (11%)	5 (3%)
Net Private Foreign Investment	– –	– –	−1 (−2%)	1 –

sales or income as the case may be – to keep pace with the share of these governments in the necessary expansion of the public sector.

(d) Limitation, to a reasonable proportion of sales, of the privilege of deducting advertising and promotional expenses from corporate income subject to tax. No observer of the American scene doubts that advertising is excessive. From the economic point of view, it absorbs too large a share of the nation's resources; at the same time it generates synthetic pressures for higher consumption.

Increased taxation is the price of growth. We must tax ourselves not only to finance the necessary increase in public expenditures but also to finance, indirectly, the expansion of private investment. A federal budget surplus is a method by which we as a nation can expand the volume of saving available for private investment beyond the current saving of individuals and corporations. The surplus must, to be sure, be coupled with measures to stimulate investment, so that the national resolution to save actually leads to capital formation and is not wasted in unemployment and unrequited loss of consumption. It is only superficially paradoxical to combine anti-inflationary fiscal policy with an expansionary monetary policy. The policies outlined above must be combined in the right proportions, so that aggregate demand is high enough to maintain a 3 percent unemployment rate but not higher. There are several mixtures which can do that job; of them we must choose the one that gives the desired composition of aggregate demand. If the overwhelming problem of democratic capitalism in the '30's and even the '50's was to bring the business cycle under social control, the challenge of the '60's is to bring under public decision the broad allocation of national output. Fortunately the means are at hand. They are techniques well within the peacetime scope of government. We can do the job without the direct controls of wartime – priorities, rationing, price and wage controls.

The means are at hand; to use them we will need to muster more wisdom, maturity, leadership and sense of national purpose than we displayed in the '50's. A program like the suggested 1965 target, which allows an increase of per capita consumption at about 1 percent a year, is scarcely a program of austerity. We are used to institutions that let us realize in increased consumption about two-thirds of increases in output. But let people earn the incomes associated with a 2.5 percent rise in output per capita, and the measures necessary to keep their consumption from rising faster than one percent may seem burdensome sacrifices. Our Communist competitors have an advantage. Since they do not pay out such increases in output as personal incomes in the first place, they do not have the problem of recapturing them in taxes or saving. That problem we cannot escape in a free society. Unless we master it, we shall not fare well in the competition for economic growth and national survival.

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WALTER LIPPMANN

As Interviewed by Howard K. Smith

HOWARD K. SMITH: Well, Mr. Lippmann, I gathered from reading your columns in the year 1952, that you then thought that the formation of an Eisenhower Administration was an urgent necessity for the nation, and I gather, from reading your columns now, that you're highly critical of that Administration.

LIPPMANN: As a matter of fact, I began to feel, in 1948, that it was very necessary to the working of our political system that the Republican Party should come into power and assume responsibility. They had been out of office, in 1948, for four terms, that's a very bad thing for a political party. They were becoming irresponsible; they were becoming frustrated; they were following demagogues like McCarthy. And in 1948, I was for Dewey. I thought that was the time to make a . . . change to a Republican who was competent and who was not an isolationist; Dewey filled that bill. Well, he failed. So by '52, it was much worse and much more urgent, and Eisenhower appeared as a possibility, and a national hero – and that had other advantages. It not only virtually insured the Republicans would come back to power, as you might say, respectably – not on a general repudiation of everything that had gone before, and during the war . . . but also because Eisenhower, due to his position as a national hero, was, in my view, bound to attack McCarthy and destroy him. And that is, as a matter of fact, what happened. McCarthy soon turned from the Democrats whom he'd been accusing of twenty years of treason, to the Republicans. And when he did that, the Republican Party dealt with him. The other thing about Eisenhower was that he alone, I thought, or rather [the one] Republican alone, was able to put an end to the Korean War. And the combination of those things made me feel, in '52, that it was essential to elect him, much as I admired Stevenson.

SMITH: What about now?

LIPPMANN: I think that President Eisenhower is not aware of the nature of the world as it is after the two world wars, and he's out of date. . . . He's pursuing a policy which is not preparing the country for the needs of the nineteen sixties and also which is not, in my view, meeting the real challenge of the Soviet Union. His views on a number of basic principles of government no longer fit the world we live in. I'll give you a concrete example – his first budget, which is 1954, laid down as a principle that it was the purpose of his Administration in the federal government to reduce the share of the national wealth that went into public purposes. This, at a time when the population of the country was growing; the character of the country was changing, in that we were becoming more and more urbanized; the challenge of the Soviet Union was becoming more and more severe, and when the wealth of the country was increasing. . . . The gross national product of the Soviet economy is growing at about $12 billion a year . . . Ours is growing probably, with our somewhat slower rate of growth, at about $15 billion. Now, [the Communists] direct, of this $12 billion increase, to national purposes a much larger percentage than we direct. By national purposes I mean military purposes; education; the development of their cities: housing and planning of cities; the development of their natural resources, which cannot be done in any country by private [means]. My recollection is that their gross national product is about one-half the size of the American – but of the half, they spend about a half. The result is that their national power is growing more rapidly than ours. But the Republican Party, under Eisenhower's leadership, does not understand the necessity of greater allocation of our resources, in a growing economy, to public needs.

SMITH: You've talked about allocating more resources to community and public needs, and this means finding the money to do it with, and when you talk about that, the objection is raised that this is big government. . . .

LIPPMANN: The best way to answer that is to look at what it means quantitatively. I think that the Rockefeller Brothers' Report, which is the latest authoritative and impartial thing that we have, estimates that all branches of government - federal, state, local – took about 20 percent of our gross national product. Now, if you take all the things that we think ought to be done, in what we call the public sector, by public spending, it would take about 24 percent. You do not revolutionize an economy by raising [expenditures] from 20 percent to 24 percent. As for this thing about big government . . . we have an inflated bureaucracy, and anything that can be done to deflate it and reduce it, well and good. But that doesn't mean you should deflate its purposes.

Mr. Lippmann's comments, from which the above is drawn, were made on July 7 over CBS during his first appearance on television.

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I think it's quite thoughtless of people who'd say, let's . . . everybody buy an automobile; that's fine. But spend the money to produce the streets in which the automobile can run and park? That's terrible, that's government spending, that's socialism. Well, of course, they haven't really thought it through.

Smith: How do governments get more money to devote to these purposes?

Lippmann: By taxation.

Smith: Are there politicians with enough courage to ask for higher taxes?

Lippmann: They're just going to have to be courageous enough, because it's necessary. Before we raise the tax rate, we close what are known as some of the loopholes in the present tax structure . . . If they were closed even partially, the revenues to the government – I don't know what percentage of what we need to spend – would be there, a very considerable part of it. And then, our present tax rates are based on what? On a tax reduction made by President Eisenhower and Mr. Humphrey in the 1954 revenue bill. Well, there's nothing in the law of the Constitution, or the Bible . . . which says that the tax rates of 1954 must never be changed. We've lived under higher taxes. How the tax burden should be distributed – whether it should all be on the rich or on the poor, or where – that's another question. In my view, the merely graduated income tax is probably not the best way to accomplish what we want to accomplish . . .

Smith: Is it possible to meet part of the bill by changing some of the expenditures we now make? For example, we're spending a huge amount on the farm program – which isn't working; on veterans who have never been injured in the service of their country.

Lippmann: But that, I think, takes more courage than raising the taxes. And I've seen the argument made that – well, why don't we reduce these [expenditures] first and then go in for the public needs? And I say, the public needs can't wait. We ought to do these other things. But if we can't do them, then we'll just have to waste the money that we waste on the farm program and on the veterans, and so on.

Smith: What are our public needs? What are some of these urgent things that cannot wait?

Lippmann: Well, first of all, there is the national defense. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of the world that there should be no question at all that the American military arm is basically invulnerable. I don't mean that we can win everywhere, or that we could defeat the Russians even, but that we cannot be knocked out. The second public need, which is urgent, is education. We are not considering the rate of growth of the school population. We are not keeping up with it. We're falling behind. And once you've failed to educate a child, you've failed, and you can't make that up later. So you have to do it currently. Because if you don't educate these children adequately, they will become the parents of children who in turn will be less adequately educated. It's a thing that degenerates if you don't deal with it promptly. We are committed, as a nation, and rightly so, to something that's never really been attempted before in the Western World – the mass education of a whole people. For instance, in Great Britain or France, everybody goes to school, but only a very small percentage goes to the university. We have got the idea that everybody should be able to get to [college]. Now, the quantitative goal, which I'm in favor of, of course, must not be at the expense of quality.

Smith: And you think we've tended to do that?

Lippmann: We have tended to do that, and that is our problem – to combine mass education with education for excellence. And that . . . makes education very expensive, but it's worth the price . . . Then, we don't spend enough on scientific research. We spend a good deal of money on research to make certain kinds of products – commercial products, which I don't think should be counted in basic research, because they do not really advance knowledge, and they are not directed to the things that are really necessary. I mean a new cosmetic may be desirable but not necessary, and the money spent by all the chemists, working on that, is a diversion from the kind of thing that we ought to have – medical research and research into space things and so on. Then, we've got to do something about the decline of our cities. Here, we are a nation which has become overwhelmingly urban in the last generation. Over a hundred million Americans or more live in cities – big cities. The more you live in the city the more money you have to spend publicly.

Smith: What about the ability of the Congress to face issues? I remember last year Senator Lyndon Johnson made a State of the Union message, in which he said the Senate would take over leadership of the nation, and then the Senate proceeded to follow the President.

Lippmann: In our system of government the only leadership that's possible is from the White House. The few occasions in our history when Congress, itself, has tried to lead – for instance, after the Civil War period, when Congress was supreme and the President was very weak, have been periods of very bad government in this country. Another bad period was after World War I – during the Harding period, when Congress was in the saddle.

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Smith: What about the Presidency as an office? Is it a possible job, or must there be changes in it, so that one man can handle it?

Lippmann: Well, the Presidency, of course, has grown into a great department of government, from being merely a personal administration, and a great many things could be done to make the burden of the job more manageable. But essentially, there's no way I can think of that you can avoid the burden of it. That's the kind of government we have and none of us wants to change it radically. And there we are.

Smith: What do you think about our decision-making process? Is it working?

Lippmann: It isn't working but it could work. I think it's worse than it needs to be, if I may say so, because of President Eisenhower's training, as a staff officer in the Army, which makes him avoid decisions. He wants his subordinate staff officers, his department heads, to come to him with agreed decisions. That isn't workable in civilian government – it might work in the Army.

Smith: What's the alternative?

Lippmann: The alternative is for the President to decide those things. It means spending a lot more time in Washington and a lot more time listening to those essential things. The next President will conduct the office very differently from President Eisenhower – no matter whether he's a Republican or a Democrat. It can't be conducted this way, through the sixties; the problems are too severe and too urgent.

Smith: Well now, Mr. Lippmann, you've talked about the things we have to do . . . We have to make the right decisions at the right time [but] can a loose democracy compete with a taut, centralized dictatorship in doing these things? Is democracy out of date in facing these problems?

Lippmann: No, I don't think so. But it does require very good leadership. I am not a pessimist about this problem, although I've written quite a lot about the faults of democracy. The thing to remember is that we're at the beginning of a new political generation. The old gentlemen who have run the world during the war and after it, are going to retire from the stage – all of them – and the men who are going to rule in not only this country but the other Western democracies, are men in their forties or early fifties.

Smith: Almost everything you've said has indicated that the answers are traceable back to leadership. What qualities does a leader – a President – have to have?

Lippmann: Well, the first thing he must have is the ability to see what matters in the excitement of daily events. He must be able to see through the latest headline to what is permanent and enduring. This ability – this second-sight is, to my mind, the quality of great leaders. Churchill has it. He's the greatest man of this century, in my view, and one of the great figures in Western history. I have unbounded admiration for that man. He had all the qualities that very great leaders have, which I call second-sight, in decision and articulateness. De Gaulle has it. I put him just second to Churchill among the great men of this century – greatest in quality. And I've felt that since June, 1940, when I first read the speech he made when he landed in England, barehanded. And when you think that out of that, he rallied France, and what he's made of her now, it is an absolutely fabulous performance. Theodore Roosevelt, who was my boyhood hero, . . . had it. Theodore Roosevelt saw in 1900 that we were a great power . . . That ability to see which way the thing is going is the basis of great leadership. The President cannot, himself, act on everything. He has to decide. So his mind has to be judicial. The function of the Presidency is to hear the arguments of the contending factions and make a decision. And that requires first, not only decisiveness, as everybody says, but the ability to be judicial about it. Then, of course, he must be articulate. He must be able to talk in language which [is] not the lowest common denominator, understand, but the best. What you must lead in a country are the best of the country and they will carry it on down. There's no use of the President trying to talk down to a fellow who can just about read and write. Let somebody else do that. He must talk to the people who teach the man to read and write. And for that, he requires articulateness. Then, he must have sympathy; he must have the ability to feel for people who are in trouble, not only here, but in Korea or in Turkey or Cuba or wherever.

Smith: You [have referred to] Franklin D. Roosevelt as one of the three great Presidents of the 20th Century. Could you expand on your estimate of him?

Lippmann: Well, I have long and mixed and confused feelings about him, having known him, as a very young man, long before he had his polio, in the First World War. . . . He was one of the most handsome, attractive young men – quite superficial, rather uneducated, but so charming that everybody liked him, but nobody ever conceived of him as President of the United States. Then came his illness and during that period he grew up. Even then, he had really not become the Roosevelt that the world knows. Even when he was nominated – even during the campaign of 1932, none of the New Deal was visible. That was all improvised after his election. Then, I had an in-and-out feeling about the New Deal. The first part of it I thought was very bad – the part that terminated in the attempt to pack the Supreme Court. And the second part of it, which had to do with the compensated economy . . . I thought was

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very good. Then he became a war President, and on the whole, he was a great war President.

Smith: What about our first postwar President – Harry Truman?

Lippmann: I was not a supporter of Truman at any time . . . And while I recognize that some very good things happened under Truman, also some bad things happened under him – I never thought that his quick way of shooting from the hip was the way the Presidency should be conducted. So I can't count myself an admirer of Truman. . . . Of course, under Truman the Marshall Plan was adopted. And that is probably the greatest single act of constructive statesmanship since the war. Also, NATO was founded. Those two things I'd rate very high. About the Korean War, my feelings are these: I think he was right to intervene and resist when he did. But I've never been satisfied that it was right to resist except by air and sea, which is what MacArthur and Eisenhower originally wanted to do. Even if you assume that that was all right – to fight a land war in Korea with American troops – he made a fatal mistake when, having won that war and driven the North Koreans across the 38th Parallel, he didn't stop there [but] went on up to the Chinese border, which brought the Chinese into the war, and created a war between China and the United States, which we have never been able to solve.

Smith: Who's to blame for that – the President or his General – General MacArthur?

Lippmann: I blame it on the President and his Secretary of State because they are responsible. Generals don't make policy of that kind, in any well-ordered government.

Smith: Well, how would you assess Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan?

Lippmann: Japan was ready for surrender before we dropped the bombs. And in my view, we should have negotiated a surrender before we dropped them. One of the things I look back on with the greatest regret, as an American, is that we were the ones that first dropped atomic bombs.

Smith: Let me ask you something about the Cold War. Do you see any way out of this situation in which we and our adversaries spend huge quantities of treasure on arms which are becoming deadlier all the time, and even by accident could destroy us?

Lippmann: If you mean by Cold War a thing which is on the verge of a real war – a shooting war, then I think the prospects are not bad. In fact, I think they're pretty good. There's a great change in Russia, and I don't mean by that, that the Russians agree with us. What I mean is that the Russians have become concentrated on an objective which is incompatible with war, namely, the development of the Soviet territory, which is one-sixth of the globe and is an enormously rich thing to develop, and that has become their great purpose . . . They cannot succeed in any of the practical purposes that they have today unless they can avoid war . . . Now the risks of war are enormously greater than any possible gain from it. So I believe the Russians, when they say they don't want a war.

Smith: It seems to me that all the basic problems between us and the Russians are such hard-rock problems, I can't imagine anyone giving on them. For example, they can't agree to [disarmament] with inspection, and we can't agree without inspection, and with inspection, they would have to change their whole way of life. And we cannot agree to the unification of Germany, except on our terms, which involve free elections. How can there be, then, a diplomatic expression of this improvement?

Lippmann: I think the agreement between Western Europe . . . and the Soviet Union about the future of Germany, is much greater than appears on the surface. Where they agree is that neither the Russians nor the French nor the British want a reunified Germany. Nobody will say this because it would be political dynamite for Dr. Adenauer in Germany to admit it. But the fact is that all British and French planning is based on the theory that Germany is not going to be reunited. So is the Soviet planning. Well, when you've agreed on as big a point as that, you've gone an awful long way towards a relaxation of tension, even if you're still disagreed about Berlin.

Smith: What about disarmament?

Lippmann: I belong to the old school that thinks that disarmament follows political agreement—never precedes it . . . Insofar as the feeling grows that we have no vital issue to go to war about – nothing worth a war – I think you'll gradually get what I would call fringe agreements about disarmament. The most obvious one is the cessation of nuclear testing.

Smith: How does this jibe with their increasing pressure on Berlin?

Lippmann: I don't think there's an increasing pressure on Berlin. I don't think the Russians are out to absorb West Berlin into East Germany . . . We won't let them do it, and therefore, they cannot risk a war over that issue. But there's another reason, and that is that West Berlin would be an indigestible thing in the system of East Germany. And I think they know it. Those West Berliners would be – two million and a half of them in a country of eighteen million – a very dangerous lot of people in their country. So I think

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what they want is not to absorb them but to insulate them from East Germany and from the West. They want to create a little community there, which is not Communist – has no position in the Communist world – on the other hand, is not an allied outpost – has no Western troops in it . . . They want to get rid of the Western presence in Berlin, and they would probably settle for some kind of arrangement . . . I don't say we ought to accept this . . . some kind of arrangement with the United Nations' force guaranteeing the freedom of West Berlin.

Smith: What about Red China? Is the time approaching when it may be wise to acknowledge the existence of that country which contains a quarter of the earth's population?

Lippmann: As a matter of fact, we do recognize them – and we are actually negotiating with the Chinese in Warsaw, about the relations over Formosa. I think the right thing would be if they were admitted to the UN – if they will adhere to the agreement for nuclear testing; that could be taken as proof that they mean to be a peace-loving state under the definitions of the UN. I would hold that out to them as the price.

Smith: In fact, without Chinese agreement, a nuclear test ban would not work, is that not so?

Lippmann: No. I don't think so because they cannot do much testing without Russian help [and] the Russian interest, I think, is not to have the Chinese have the bombs. Because who would be the most likely victim of them? We? The Chinese, even if they get a few bombs, can't do anything to us. They don't have a great missile . . . which is much more expensive than the bombs. But Russia, with four thousand miles of frontier – they've got to look out for the Chinese. Now, the question of the United States having diplomatic relations with China is still another question. They'll get into the UN, I imagine, before we recognize them. And there, we have certain issues that we have to settle with them . . . They're holding people of ours prisoners, and so on. Those have to be released . . .

Smith: You've talked about our relations with our adversaries – what about our relations with our allies?

Lippmann: In answering that question, you must distinguish between the NATO military establishment, as it now exists, and the alliance of the Atlantic community, which is a much bigger thing. In my view, the Atlantic community is a fact of history which cannot be dissolved and won't be dissolved. And we are inevitable allies in any struggle which is of vital interest to us. There is some question as to just where the boundaries of the Atlantic community are. Germany has never been part of it, for instance. We hope at least to bring West Germany into it. But broadly speaking, the Atlantic community is an indissoluble thing. It was made by God and geography and not by man.

Smith: Well, is there anything we can do to aid God and geography to make it work better?

Lippmann: I think yes. I think NATO, which is the military establishment, is probably getting obsolete and should be revised. I can remember when our great fear was that the Red Army was going to start rolling through West Germany and into Paris. And that was when we started NATO . . . Nobody thinks that any more – not in the missile age. So [NATO] tends to be obsolete. And that's what General de Gaulle is complaining about. General de Gaulle wants NATO, and he wants the Atlantic community . . . but he's a far-seeing General, with a much greater military mind than anybody who's ever put his mind on NATO. And, when he says it needs to be revised, I'm willing to listen to him.

Smith: What would you say is going to be the biggest single job the next President of the US will have?

Lippmann: Mobilizing the country to meet the Soviet challenge (I don't use this in a military sense); to gather together and make available to the nation our wealth, our growing wealth, for the purpose of meeting the competition of the Soviet Union and of solving our own problems. That has to be made clear to the people – that this is the big task of the nineteen sixties. We're going to have to grow up to the times, or fall way behind in the competition.

Smith: It's become almost a recent tradition for the Legislature, in this country, to be dominated by one party, and the Administration or the Executive Branch to be run by the other party. What do you think of that arrangement?

Lippmann: It's a very recent thing and I think a passing one. But on the whole, in our history, if a President was elected, he usually carried the House with him. And if he was at all successful, he carried the Senate with him by the next mid-term election. No, I don't think [a divided government is] a good thing. I think it's a bad thing.

Smith: According to the opinion polls, the [next] Congress is certain to be won by the Democrats, but a leading Democrat said to me recently: "While the Republicans can't win the coming Presidential election, the Democrats can lose it." If that happens do you think it will be a calamity that the two are divided once more?

Lippmann: Yes, and I think it will be worse under Mr. Nixon than it was under Mr. Eisenhower. Because President Eisenhower has a prestige which Mr. Nixon can't hope to attain, and [Eisenhower's] relations with the Democrats, who nearly nominated him in '48, are very much better than Mr. Nixon's.

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Smith: About our immediate future, are you optimistic or pessimistic?

Lippmann: I don't believe in being pessimistic because what's the good of giving up before you're finished . . . What is more, I think we don't know what the country in the sixties will be like, with a new crop of young men under good leadership . . . We're at the end of something that is petering out and aging and about finished. The country survived a period, in my experience, after the First World War, which is very like what we've been through in the last few years. That was the great Jazz Age of the 1920's – and you wouldn't have supposed they'd ever have a serious thought again. But that wasn't true – and it will pass as soon as the country gets purposes which are articulated by an effective leader.

Smith: Well, the world has seemed to come apart at the seams: the U-2 affair has happened; the Summit conference has collapsed, and the Japanese crisis involving our treaty with Japan has happened. I would like to ask you to try to assess the meaning of these events . . . A Gallup poll recently suggested that most people now think war with Russia is likely.

Lippmann: I don't think the world's come apart and I don't think that war is more likely than it was before. But, on the other hand, the events that have happened will have a great effect on the American position, particularly in Asia . . . We're only at the beginning of the chain of events that have been set in motion by the U-2 incident – by the discovery that these bases – American bases, around the outer rim of Asia, were being used for purposes which the Soviet Union resented . . . We've only begun to see the consequences of that. There's nothing in the world that could protect Japan or Formosa, or any of these countries right on the edge. The only thing that can protect them is the fact that we would retaliate, but in the process they wouldn't be in a very happy condition. I expect to see a growth of neutralism in a more and more insistent and even violent form, such as we've already begun to see in Japan, spread all around that semi-circle which extends from Japan through Korea, Formosa, Vietnam to Pakistan and Turkey.

Smith: There's an appearance, at least, of increased unity in Western Europe, among our allies, as a result of these troubles. Can it be that the case of Japan was just an isolated incident?

Lippmann: Europe is different from Asia, and I think in Europe the violence of Khrushchev's language – the fact that he broke off the Summit meeting – caused a rallying of sentiment to the United States – a rally that probably would not have taken place if Khrushchev had not behaved so badly. But in Asia, the situation is different . . . In these countries, where the bases are around the outer edge of the Soviet Union, and of China . . . the people feel themselves threatened.

Smith: In regard to our alliances, there is at present in Washington, a strong mood of reappraisal. Could you suggest what general lines such a reappraisal might follow?

Lippmann: Speaking broadly . . . there are two lines it'll have to follow. One is the line of devising weapons that do not require bases in weak countries, right near the Soviet Union. That is a job for the Pentagon. It's a question of being able to get along without the bases. We've already made up our minds to get along without the bases in Morocco, in Iceland, and sooner or later we're going to have to get out of the bases that are in positions where the country is incapable of defending itself in case there's retaliation from the Soviet Union. That means longer range missiles; all that is a technical matter. But I think it's true to say the Pentagon is already working on the plans for that kind of military armament. The other line is that we have to find a way, through diplomacy, of gradually converting the policy of lining up these countries as military allies to [one of] improving the position of neutrality for those countries. To illustrate the point – for a long time we had really bad relations with India, because we were always trying to line up India in a military sense, and the Indians wouldn't join. When we gave up that policy and accepted the neutralism of India, we became quite popular in India. That was helped, to be sure, by the Chinese aggression on the Indian frontier. But the fear of the United States diminished when we ceased to want to use them as a military base.

Smith: The stock fear that is expressed in Washington, about pursuing a policy like this, in respect to Japan, is [that] Japan will go neutralist, and then eventually it will be on the slippery slope and will go over to the other side.

Lippmann: I know that is the argument. But I myself think it's not a sound argument. I think that the presence of foreign troops or airplanes and military establishments tends to provoke – to promote Communist propaganda in the country. People said that when Egypt [became] neutral it would become Communist – that hasn't happened. They said Iraq was going to go that way – it didn't. There's no evidence that the presence of American military missions and bases stops these countries from becoming Communist . . . We'll draw back somewhat, especially in the Far East. But basically . . . our influence, if we are able to solve our own problems and deal with our own affairs well, will expand. And the greatest influence we can have in the world comes from proving that we can make a big democracy like this work.

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Contraception and Christian Doctrine

by Richard Sparks

The Democratic convention is over, and there is now an odds-on chance that a Roman Catholic will be elected President in November. Whether there will be a revival of the discussion of "the Catholic issue" between now and the election is impossible to say. It may be that the majority of the electorate is convinced that if Senator Kennedy is otherwise qualified for the Presidency he should not be rejected because of his religion; no one has done more than the Senator himself to clarify the point. But the more important question of the proper relationship between religion and politics in America – which by no means concerns only Roman Catholics – will in any case continue long after the coming election.

Birth Control and Public Policy
by Norman St. John-Stevas
(Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions)

If the noisy controversy which flourished with Wisconsin and faded with West Virginia and Los Angeles did nothing else, it brought forth copious intelligent arguments – not least in *The New Republic* – which by their very existence in print may help insure that "the Catholic issue" is resolved with a minimum of prejudice. Progress in political affairs ultimately depends on the degree to which people can understand the ideas of others, and how fully they are aware of the alternatives available to them. In turn, this understanding depends to some degree on how far one person's ideas can be made meaningful to another person. This is essentially the reason for Mr. St. John-Stevas' booklet, which is one of several to be issued by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, now the main activity of the Fund for the Republic, aimed especially at clarifying issues raised by the power of non-governmental institutions in American society. Publication was timed to coincide with the opening of the Democratic convention; but it is in no sense an exercise in electioneering.

Mr. St. John-Stevas is an English lawyer and a Roman Catholic; he is a graduate of both Oxford and Cambridge, and has taught law at Oxford, Yale and the University of London. He is the author of a study of Walter Bagehot; and in his book *Obscenity and the Law* he included a draft bill upon which Britain's present and markedly liberal Obscene Publications Law, finally passed last year, was based. *Birth Control and Public Policy* is taken from a forthcoming book on law and morals, *Life, Death and the Law*. It is a careful and scholarly study of the legal and political issues raised by the question of birth control, written necessarily from a Catholic – though not explicitly Catholic – viewpoint; just how representative of American Catholic opinion Mr. John-Stevas is, is another matter. But whether or not one agrees entirely with his wider conclusions as to the relationship between religion and politics – and I for one do not – he has undoubtedly made an important contribution to the discussion.

Certainly birth control raises a number of important political questions, involving existing federal and state laws, education, public hospitals and foreign aid, among other things. Despite this, I am not so sure that I agree that "Americans are hopelessly divided" on this subject, as Mr. John Cogley claims in his introduction to this booklet; there is a fair amount of evidence (some of it presented by Mr. St. John-Stevas) that many Catholics and Protestants hold virtually identical views on contraception. Nor am I sure that this is the most important area of contention between religious denominations in American society; the fondness of some Catholics for censorship, for example, seems to me far more dangerous. But if the birth control controversy is not "ticking away like an angry bomb ready to explode at any moment" (Cogley again), it is a potential area of conflict, and one in which religious factors – rather than economic or sociological ones – are of the most primary importance.

Mr. St. John-Stevas begins with a valuable survey of both the history and present status of contraception, in law and society, in England and the United States. Though if read literally, federal laws impose an absolute and universal ban on contraceptive devices and information, they have been substantially modified by judicial interpretations (including the splendidly-titled *United States v. One Package* case in 1936), and today it is state laws which are most restrictive. But in the five states in which the sale and advertisement of contraceptives are prohibited, the law has practical effects in only two, Massachusetts and Connecticut. (The other three are Mississippi, Kansas and Nebraska.) The author points out that even in Massachusetts and Connecticut birth control laws are virtually unenforceable, and that their chief effect is to exclude birth control clinics; he advocates their repeal, and points out the grounds (reasonable use of police power and the limitations of religious freedom) on which a successful attack on them may be based in the future.

There are excellent discussions of both Catholic and Protestant theological attitudes, and part of the author's thesis seems to be that these are ultimately irreconcilable. It is interesting to note that many Protestant churches have not been so liberal regarding birth control for so long as is often claimed. Catholic opposition to certain methods of birth control – not, as is sometimes claimed by non-Catholics, to family planning itself – is based almost entirely on Catholic interpretation of the natural law. A number of supporting sociological arguments are often set forth by Catholics, as the author says, "mainly for polemic purposes and as a gloss to illustrate the natural law." The argument that Catholics should not be forced to support with their taxes practices which they consider to be immoral has more

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weight, though regarding (say) the manufacture of nuclear weapons, it clearly would not stand up.

Mr. St. John-Stevas is firm in stating that not all contraventions of the natural law are subjects for legislation, and that laws embodying moral precepts are only enforceable if they are backed by a corresponding moral consensus. For Catholics to continue to agitate for birth-control legislation, he adds, will only increase the likelihood that Protestants will come to look on the Catholic Church as a political power structure rather than as a religious body: and "this is a high price to pay for ineffectual statutes." Furthermore, while it is claimed that Catholics are within their democratic social rights in taking political action (such as the boycotting of fund-raising campaigns, to force the withdrawal of the Planned Parenthood League), he says that "in proportion to the ill effect [of such tactics] their good effect is small, and Catholics would be well advised to abandon them."

The question of tax-supported hospitals is more difficult, and Mr. St. John-Stevas recommends the compromise finally reached in New York City. This provides that birth control advice should be given to any woman patient if she wants it, or if her health would be endangered by pregnancy; that employees of hospitals who have religious or moral objections to the procedure should be excused from participation; and that contraceptive advice not required for medical reasons should be left to voluntary agencies and doctors in private practice. Regarding Catholic hospitals, he holds that they are justified in refusing to give contraceptive advice (though what if the only hospital in the community were a Catholic one?), but he points out that the association of non-Catholic staff doctors, outside the hospital, is none of the hospital authorities' business. A compromise in the interests of civil peace, he says, should lead to a refusal to supply foreign aid funds for birth control programs, even if the country receiving aid should ask for them for this purpose.

Here I dissent. It is true that the constitutions and political philosophies of the United States and England do not deny Catholics (or anyone else) the right to work for the passage of birth-control laws or any other laws which spring from their religious beliefs, "using all normal political means, such as public campaigns, distribution of literature, and lobbying of legislators, to attain their end." But is anyone wise to press this right too far? Mr. St. John-Stevas remarks that "if religion is to be more than a purely personal and private exercise, if it sets out to provide a *Weltanschauung*, then it is bound to have social effects which may diminish the freedom of those who reject the faith." To which at least one reply is that such a role is incompatible with the harmony of a society of many kinds of believers and non-believers. In a sense it seems to me incorrect to speak of using *political* means to secure the passage of laws based on denominational doctrines as beliefs, and to try to obtain harmony by trading compromises (say, limited contraception in tax-supported hospitals swapped for no contraception to foreign aid even if it is asked for). To do this can lead to stalemate where action may be needed; more seriously, it creates group tensions where none need exist.

If the will of God cannot be put into understandable and commonly accepted terms, then only "compromise in the interests of civil peace" is possible; Senator Kennedy's simple declaration that he would judge a contentious issue "by whether it would be in the best interests of the United States" seems a far better solution.

To Puerto Rico, With Love

by Stephen Mahoney

From the mainland, anthropologists, PhD candidates, economists on foundation grants, journalists, and sociologists have been streaming into the island of Puerto Rico at an alarming rate. The Puerto Ricans submit to the invaders' interviews and questionnaires. Then along about the end of spring every year results are harvested. (The cane harvest is over about the same time.) There is a good deal of socio-economic rumble, as the books go into the achievements of the government in luring industry to the island and creating jobs. Inevitably it is asserted that this "Operation Bootstrap" is the answer to Communism: Africans and South Americans are advised to pay attention.

Puerto Rico: Land of Wonders
by Earl Parker Hanson
(Knopf; $4.50)

Puerto Rico: Island of Promise
by Ruth Gruber
(Hill and Wang; $3.95 – paper $1.95)

Puerto Rico: A Success Story
by Ralph Hancock
(Van Nostrand; $4.75)

Here are three such books about Puerto Rico's industrialization and social progress. They include one that is the best available, Mr. Hanson's *Land of Wonders*. Mr. Hanson is a geographer and economist, and his book is an updating of his *Transformation*, which was published in 1955.

The other two general books in the new crop are passable journalism, I suppose. Miss Gruber and Mr. Hancock tell the familiar story. In Mr. Hancock's version of it, particularly, the telling is supported by extensive research. In neither book, however, is there criticism or thoughtful consideration of the meaning of the data.

It is an exciting story the books tell. The New-Dealing Popular Democratic party has been in power for twenty years. In that time, the sugar colonials have been run out, land has been distributed, the minimum wage has been doubled (or tripled, or quintupled, depending on which of the available sets of figures is credited); vast slums have been cleared; cheap decent housing has been erected; sanitation is up; public health is up; the average life span has come up from something like 45 to 68.

A third of the government's budget goes into education. Literacy is up. There are 16,000 students in the University. The island is self-governed (and excellently). Politicians are honest. Astonishingly, votes are no longer bought! (They used to go for $2 apiece, when $2 was a couple days' pay. A conscientious fellow would vote a number of times

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each election day, and this way put something aside to help his family in the intervening months between the sugar cane harvests.)

Tax exemptions, as everybody knows, have helped lure industry to Puerto Rico. Low wages and government-built factory buildings have helped. Less well publicized, except where it counts, are thumping 19th-Century profits. Garment makers employing skilled Puerto Rican needle-workers may ring up each year a 50 percent net profit on investment – or better.

One way and another, some 600 new factories, and their payrolls, have been brought into existence in Puerto Rico. The income from manufacture exceeds income from agriculture, something inconceivable a few years ago. And a hotel erected by the government a while back started a tourist boom that will deposit $50 million in Puerto Rico this year, to be trickled up and down.

Ruth Gruber is a correspondent for *The New York Herald-Tribune*. Her *Puerto Rico: Island of Promise* is a reworking of a series of articles she did for the *Trib* in 1958. Much of her book is random anecdotes. Mr. Hancock is a journalist who specializes in Latin America. He tells the story with ardor, speed, useful information, and occasional baroque figures of speech. ("The island of Puerto Rico hangs like a neon shingle from the bracket formed by the Lesser Antilles.")

Earl Parker Hanson is an old Puerto Rico hand. He was in the island as a planner in the bad old days of the thirties, when Secretary Ickes was beginning to try to cope with it. Those years, as Mr. Hanson remembers, the country roads were choked with funeral processions for infants who had starved. His documentation is relentless. He even points to empty stretches of canvas in the picture of new Puerto Rico, and since Mr. Hanson lives in Puerto Rico, you wonder at his courage. Puerto Ricans are maddeningly oversensitive to criticism, as Alfred Kazin recently said in a brilliant piece in *Commentary*.

The truth is that the most important achievements of the *Populares* have been outside economics and industry. The most important of all has been the rousing of hope – the freeing of creative energies. A formerly colonial people numbed by despair has begun to take hold of the idea that it can control its future. Of the modern Puerto Rican, Mr. Hanson says, certainly correctly, "He is under far greater pressure to improve life than was his father, who accepted his abject poverty, his gnawing hunger, the deaths of his children, with a hopeless fatalism."

There have been very encouraging accomplishments in housing, education, and public health. But for all the new factories, there are more people unemployed now than there were twenty years ago. (Thirteen or 15 percent of the labor force, as against 11 percent in 1940.) The birth rate at present is 31.8 per 1000 people per year; the death rate has been reduced to 7.2

The outstanding resource of Puerto Rico, in its "Operation Bootstrap," is its relationship with the United States. While 50 thousand people have got jobs as a result of the industrialization program, twenty times that many have emigrated, without restriction, to the continental United States to seek jobs. Puerto Rico is inside our tariff curtain, and yet it need not abide by the federal government's minimum wage laws. Puerto Rico does not contribute to the federal treasury, but it picks up federal bounty – about $40 million of it a year. The Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Puerto Ricans sending money home from the mainland, pump more millions into the island.

For the writers of each season's crop of books on Puerto Rico, the island has still another source of fascination besides its being the painless antidote to Communism. This is Governor Luís Muñoz Marín.

Mr. Hanson knew Muñoz in the Twenties, in Greenwich Village, when Muñoz was a bohemian poet and socialist writing pieces for *The New Republic* and the like. Hanson regards Muñoz (as do all writers, including this one) with idolatry. Of Muñoz' return to Puerto Rico from New York and of his entrance into active politics, Mr. Hanson says, gravely: "Then 'the man' appeared. He stirred his people out of their lethargy, taught them political awareness and morality, and promised to set them on the tortuous upward road to their salvation."

It is interesting that of a meeting with Muñoz in Puerto Rico in 1931 Mr. Hanson recalls that Muñoz was "deeply and resentfully concerned with the effect the United States was having on his people. The old, leisurely habit of sitting in coffee houses for hours, discussing politics and praising or damning poets, was giving way to a frenetic chase after the dollar; the coffee houses themselves were disappearing in favor of soda fountains. . . . The people were losing their cultural identity under the terrifying impact of the United States. Where would it end?"

Well, I suppose Muñoz is responsible, in a way, for the new snackbars and soda fountains. No doubt he prefers to remember other accomplishments – say the election victory of 1940. The vote of the urban class was certain to go to the conservative parties. Near-penniless, Muñoz wandered from one village to another in the hills, audaciously soliciting free votes from people accustomed to being paid (and accustomed to politicians).

That he was successful is, in retrospect, not surprising. The country people of Puerto Rico have the reputation of being wonderfully warm, enthusiastic, and generous. Or they did. All that, of course, is changing now, one hears, with the progress of modern technological civilization flattening things out.

But "Where *did* the good old days go?" Mr. Hanson asks. "They went the ways of ubiquitous starvation, illness, despair." During Muñoz' administrations, Puerto Ricans have solved difficult problems. To insist, as writers of books on Puerto Rico seem bound to, that they are the problems of colonial peoples everywhere – the only ones, too – is to mock the real trials of the emerging new world. It is also to miss the real achievements of Puerto Rico.

"THE MORE KENNEDY TRIES *to turn his youth into a virtue the more his listeners realize that the legendary qualities of youth—freshness of outlook, resoluteness, daring—are exactly the qualities this young man lacks. His ideas are drab pickings from the decadent Liberalism he claims to espouse; his will seems as flabby as Stevenson's, his style was canned and patented on Madison Avenue many years ago. Kennedy's youth, in other words, is* all *that is young about him.*"

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ART

A Panorama of Spanish Moderns

It's a safe bet that the summer show at the Guggenheim in New York will please no one but the dwindling minority who cling to their God-given ability to look at paintings as objects on the wall rather than bench-marks of juvenile delinquency or counters in the America First phase of abstract expressionist dialectic. Recalling the Guggenheim's old custom of soliciting testimonials of spiritual benefits derived from paintings by Rudolf Bauer, I drifted down the ramp on a recent Sunday, ears alert for any murmured *ex votos;* times have changed: the most frequently overheard comment was, "He's kidding." As to the latter, America First, alternative, it is easy to see the Burton K. Wheelers of the movement rallying against the Guggenheim with special fury. The America Firsters are now engaged in an all-out fight against André Malraux, the French novelist, critic and public servant, although it is not at all certain that Malraux is aware the war is on. What Malraux did to bring it on was to support the notion that Frenchmen were capable of painting large, gaudy, thick-textured, non-figurative works of art without being taught to do so by the Americans. Well, obviously he had to be put in his place and that process had just begun when the Guggenheim opened its exhibition of paintings by Spaniards mostly in their thirties who paint in the same way and do so with no regard at all for the American Way. Clearly, from the point of view of the America Firsters, the show at the Guggenheim is treason in time of war.

Before Picasso; After Miró
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum
New York

The chief evidence of treason is also the chief merit in most of the 63 paintings by 18 young Spaniards. Mr. Sweeney, director of the Guggenheim, makes the point in the catalog that the artists mostly "limit themselves to an austere color gamut of browns, grays, slates, grey greens and ochres so characteristically of Spanish taste." This is true enough, but the really distinguishing mark of the show is organization. The true revealed American Way in painting of this sort is a happy chaos, the impression being sought and given that the artist has turned loose a great flux of color and texture and caught a certain amount of it on the surface of his painting, somewhat as a man might catch feathers in a seive in a room full of exploded pillows.

The work of the Spaniards isn't like that a bit. It is all organized fairly tightly, some of it even symmetrically. Most of the works are called "Painting," but the word is used as a noun rather than a participle in the American fashion. The paintings are objects made, not records of acts. The only loose painting in the group is one of the very few with a specific reference to the outside world. This is Antonio Saura's "Large Reclining Nude," which looks as if it might have been made by decorating the nude with paint and then having her recline upon the large canvas, an impression greatly heightened by the presence at one end of two distinct hand prints, both of the right hand.

On the other hand are most of the other painters. Manolo Millares, for example, paints upon burlap and twists and stretches the burlap, also cutting holes in it, with what might strike you as a frenzy as fine as any American's. Not so; the shreds and tatters and splatters and splashes are all tightly organized into rough, simple geometric forms. Francisco Farreras is an artist of wrinkled paper, a very popular medium these days, but he too organizes the filmy stuff so that his works look like constructions of large dragonfly wings. Modest Cuixart's "Painting" – or one of them at least – has a heavy disk sprinkled lightly with aluminum powder just above center in a rectangle of black. Fernando Zobel places delicate spatters of black on white, but the placing is done with precision and the spattering with restraint. One of his works looks like three dandelion puffs being wafted through the air.

Burlap is not the only new material used by the Spaniards. Manuel Rivera constructs paintings out of layers of wire mesh, carefully cut into geometrical forms. These look something like Sue Fuller's constructions of nylon string and something like Richard Lippold's of metal wire, but Rivera has saved himself a lot of work by starting with the weave already made by the screen factory. His constructions are all called "Metamorphosis," which I take to refer to the interplay of one screen with another as you change your own position in regard to the surface. All of this you may regard as slight stuff, but all of it was made with the welcome collaboration of the intellect, which seems to be the chief distinction between European and American work of this general kind.

The only young Spaniard familiar to many Americans would be Antonio Tàpies, whose dried out mud pack won the top prize at the last Carnegie International in Pittsburgh. He's still making mud packs and they still look as if they'd fall apart in a year.

To balance the young organization men of Spain and to justify the show's rather curious title, the Guggenheim has added what amounts to a retrospective-memorial exhibition of paintings by Isidro Nonell, a Barcelona painter who lived from 1873 to 1911. Mr. Sweeney professes to see some connection between Nonell's Gypsies and Beggars and the nonobjective works in the rest of the show, but the connection between Nonell and the very young, Barcelona-period Picasso is a lot clearer. What the catalog warns us against as the "apparent figurative character" of Nonell's work is apparent indeed in his

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:
July 4 August 1 August 22 September 5

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue of September 12.

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sweet, sad studies of the Spanish poor.

The only really outrageous note in the show is the implication that it fully covers Spanish painting. Dali is not mentioned anywhere – only Picasso, Miró and Gris. Whatever one thinks of Dali, he did exist, still does and is highly regarded in Spain. It is incredible that no one at all in Spain between 26 and 41 is painting under his influence. The Guggenheim is entitled to declare Rudolph Bauer to have never been; after all, the museum invented him. But it did not invent Dali and has no right to uninvent him for the occasion.

For what it's worth as a political note, I should mention that Fascism has come a long way in cultural sophistication since the high old days of Degenerate Art shows in Germany. Heading the list of those whose "suggestions, help and generous cooperation" made the show possible is Franco's ambassador in Washington.

FRANK GETLEIN

MOVIES

The Ordeals of Oscar Wilde

I can't recall an occasion before the current Oscar Wilde films when two pictures on the same subject were released simultaneously. Comparison is inevitable and necessary. Since they contend for your attention (presumably few people will see both), it might be convenient to treat the films something like political tickets, to run down the lineups and compare them. (F or M will indicate the Peter Finch or Robert Morley film.)

The Trials of Oscar Wilde (Warwick)
Oscar Wilde (Vantage)

Stars. Finch, if only because he is physically less fitted for the part than Morley, has had to exercise his imagination to a much greater extent than his rival. In the past, Finch's besetting temptation as an actor has been to let the masculinity of his presence and the velvet of his voice do most of his work for him: merely to appear and let you take it on credit that such a fetching fellow could not possibly be a poor actor. This has resulted in some vacuous performances garnished with sex appeal. Here, however, he has made a strong and subtle effort to generate character, and if there are not enough touching moments, the fault is also the scriptwriter's. He creates a warm, mellow, and troubled figure whose witty remarks seem the overflow, rather than the purpose, of his being. His infatuation with Alfred Douglas and his forebodings about it are tinged tragically.

Robert Morley is by now a corrupt actor, which is not to say he is unappealing. I remember his stage performance of Wilde some twenty-five years ago as having cut close to the nerve, conveying a feeling of something fine caught in an incongruous but elegant body. By now he has become a one-man business – R. Morley Inc., Specialist in Elephantine Urbanity, Elaborate Phrases Humorously Mouthed to Order. He does it all with impeccable timing and poise and occasionally he comes close to moving us, but it is too late for him to bother about acting. He has developed a unique and highly successful line of work, and he is entertaining when he sticks to it.

Alfred Douglas. John Fraser (F) is perfect: Grecian, volatile, a minx without mincing. John Neville (M) is rather too venerable for the part and a bit fruity: an actor full of pear-shaped tones and distressingly perfect diction.

Queensbury. Lionel Jeffries (F) is a crabbed, frightening, somehow understandable madman. Edward Chapman (M) is an old-fashioned heavy.

Edward Carson. James Mason (F) gives the prosecutor the appropriate Irish brogue, Ralph Richardson gives him Richardson incision. Not much to choose between them.

Direction. Ken Hughes (F) has, with the exception of the long opening scene, managed to lose the staginess that often dogs Victorian films, courtroom films, and films about playwrights. His picture achieves a good cinematic flow. Gregory Ratoff's direction (M) is deplorable: and so is the lighting.

Screenplay. Here Jo Eisinger (M) has an edge. Ken Hughes (F) has written a less lumpy script, one which – again excepting the first scene – avoids being an anthology of *bon mots* and famous names. Because he uses all three trials, he gives a fuller sense of Wilde's protracted torment. And (partly because of Fraser) his script is much more convincing about the Lord Alfred relationship. But he has skimped a crucial matter which is developed more fully by Eisinger. What convicted Wilde was not his purple-eyed liason with Douglas but his association with a lot of wretched male prostitutes. It is conceivable that, with the aid of his own eloquence on the subject of "pure" male love, a man of Wilde's eminence might have been acquitted. But when that grubby troop began to parade in from the male brothel, Parnassus blew up and Wilde was finished. Also, Eisinger attempts to explain Wilde's refusal to flee and his almost insanely incredible testimony by having Wilde say that he felt like a character in a play with no will of his own, speaking foreordained words. The matter was, of course, enormously complicated: among other things, I think that Wilde, who for all his bohemanism was an Irish Catholic and a Victorian, willed his own punishment; but Eisinger at least sketches in an explanation.

On points, then, the Finch film is better, if unsatisfactory. But neither film faces the real issue. Both pretend that Wilde was martyrized because of a platonic love that was misunderstood by Philistines. In fact he was pilloried because of acts which, if they had been heterosexual, would have elicited about equal parts of conventional shock and envy. What was on trial here, essentially, was a person's right to be homosexual. It was simply too early in the calendar of social progress for Wilde to claim that right.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Richard Sparks *is an American who is on the staff of the London* Economist. Stephen Mahoney, *who lives in New York, has worked for the government in San Juan, Puerto Rico.*

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TELEVISION

Rigged Figures at Miami Beach

Back in the tame twenties, Atlantic City was less arcane about its beauty contest: it was simply a gam show to keep the Boardwalk filled the week after Labor Day. Now it is offered as a substitute for federal aid to education. Scholarships for charming young ladies chaperoned by duennas is the new formula, although most girls rightly figure that an elementary course in statistics (say, 36-24-36) is still the best preparation for becoming Miss America.

Leave it to Miami Beach, however, to perfect the formula. With scores of its fancy hotels close to bankruptcy, every crowd-getter counts, including the Miss Universe Beauty Pageant, lately seen by courtesy of Crest and Lilt over CBS-TV on July 9. The "serious purpose" of this cross between Minsky and Vassar is international friendship, symbolized by the losers parading in native garb (*e.g.*, a Canadian Mounties Petty girl) and set speeches on how "America is wonderful and won't you visit my homeland," in a girl's native tongue. There is also an Amity award, tied, ironically, by Miss Burma and Miss Louisiana. Miss Louisiana completely boggled her rehearsed spontaneous acceptance speech and wiggled her blonde head in dismay . . . "I love everyone in this contest." This year, by the way, marked the first time a colored girl from America represented a state, an eighteen-year-old charmer from Ohio.

But even here the ugly hand of "rigging" appeared. Some 18 girls were found to be falsifying their pectoral measurements, and another not slim enough lass cheated with a corset, under her bathing suit. The swim suit sponsors of this summit conference (Catalina) exposed the rigged figures.

Arthur Godfrey was there for Procter and Gamble, grumbling that the Cincinnati concern misled him by not saying that all the entrants were chaperoned. Arthur gave his all for international brotherhood, plying Miss Universe 1959 with several words of Japanese, "you're a living doll" leeringly retranslated for TV one-worlders. In an expansive, philosophical introduction he also declaimed that the program just went to show how men (sic) are pretty much the same all over the world, and that the contestants looked like people you see every day in Everytown, USA.

Charles Collingwood and Jayne Meadows tried painfully to save the whole proceedings. What do *you* think of America, dearies? Do you want to stay, or do you have to go home right away? When the Viennese doll said she was amazed at America's wonderful food, Miss Meadows allowed that she preferred Wiener schnitzel to hamburgers and hot dogs any day. Each question Jayne Meadows raised seemed to complicate things more. How do you find American men? OK, was the noncommital reply of a blasé contestant. When she asked the Spanish girl how many beauty contests she had entered in Spain, the girl bluntly pointed out that in her country they didn't allow girls to parade around half-naked in public. Jayne nervously reassured her, "Well we allow it here, good luck." To another who had decided since joining the contest to switch careers from being a concert pianist to cracking Hollywood, Miss Meadows eagerly suggested a compromise: "Maybe you can star in a musical biography of a concert pianist."

Maybe, is right. In the 39 years since the Miss America Pageant started, not one winner has yet achieved stardom. Still, they hope. Linda Beeman, Miss USA and now the Miss Universe of 1960, in her first regal interview recalled that she had dreamed of being a beauty queen since she was fourteen. In fishing for ways to praise this ordinary eighteen-year-old from Salt Lake City (Her message: "I love you all; thanks for supporting me"), Charles Collingwood noted that she had the most beautiful walk in the contest. Foreign girls, Collingwood sociologized, don't walk as well as American girls. Arthur Godfrey winked luridly about the man in the audience with binoculars.

In round figures, Miss Beeman stands to pick up $100,000 in prizes and gifts. In Latin America, where these are matters of national pride, last year's winner will have her utility bills paid for the rest of her life by a grateful government. She has become the goodwill ambassadress of Colombia, and after a year of globe-girdling still has thirteen foreign invitations outstanding, including audiences with the Pope and Princess Grace of Monaco. Then Senorita Luz Marina Zuluaga can settle down in a $60,000 mansion given her by grateful compatriots and lick ten-cent stamps on which she is portrayed. Perhaps her most important gift from a Yanqui standpoint is a lifetime permit to park her car any place, fire zones included.

For the next episode in "Life Can Be Beautiful," tune in CBS-TV, Saturday, September 10, and join the estimated 30,000 who will have come to see how the Misses America since 1921 have made out. For the first time, corporations *not* donating scholarships to the parading scholars will be able to buy ads in the souvenir program. It figures.

Patrick D. Hazard

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

On Knocking Miss Novak

Sirs:

I am sick and tired of Stanley Kauffmann knocking Kim Novak. She is a terrific-looking woman. Motion pictures are not, as Mr. Kauffmann seems to believe, transmogrified novels or adjusted plays; these two art-forms have as little to do with motion pictures as they have to do with each other. Motion pictures are giant projections of religious imagery. To criticize Miss Novak because her tone of voice is always the same is as absured as criticizing a Byzantine ikon because it is static and badly drawn. If it were plastic and fluent, how could we give it our devotion? The actors and actresses which we movie-goers require are precisely those who, whether disguised as a shiek, a cowboy, an empress, a kooch-dancer, or what have you, remain triumphantly *themselves*. A large part of our aesthetic pleasure springs from the *incongruity* of, say, Kim Novak pretending to be

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somebody she is not. As actors and actresses – equipped with what Mr. Kauffmann calls "talent," "versatility," "emotional range," etc. – progress toward *convincing* impersonation, our aesthetic pleasure dwindles to nothing. Mr. Kauffmann brings to a monolithic imagery whose rhythms and patterns are most analogous to music a set of aesthetic reactions apparently derived from a course in Great Books and a seminar on Method Acting. He is not a *bad* critic, he is an inverted one: the opposite of everything he says is true.

John Updike
Ipswich, Massachusetts

In Reply:

Let's not deceive ourselves: Mr. Updike isn't joking, not half. His letter is an excellent statement of a view widely held by intellectuals, and usually summed up in the phrase "I only like bad movies." To them a film theater is a kind of steamy bath or opium den to which one goes for a faintly wicked and figuratively supine little debauch, free of all the artistic and other considerations that plague their big brains outside. The badness of bad films and bad acting is to them an occasion to despise the cheapness in the world. Ambivalence occurs; Hollywood's myth-drug, created with giant faces and bosoms that can be adored and desired from Harrisburg to Hongkong on the same evening, provides a sense of community with the couple necking in the row ahead at the same time that you feel you're on a comfortably slithery slumming trip.

No wonder Mr. Updike thinks I view films as transmogrified novels and plays (although if he had flattered me with closer attention in the past two years he would know how I feel on that subject – and on method acting). He must of course, decry any attempt to apply to films standards of the same level (not the same standards) as those of interesting literary or dramatic criticism. He prefers to watch the attractive Miss Novack make a fool of herself. Well, some people like to watch lady wrestlers grappling in the mud. Presumably Miss Novak as Medea would raise him to the heights of Kimiolatry.

No wonder, too, that he thinks me inverted. We certainly don't stand on the same ground. Whichever one of us is right side up, there is no question that it would be a lot easier to be his kind of film critic; I'd have a lot more fun at Jayne Mansfield movies.

Stanley Kauffmann
New York, N.Y.

The Democratic Decision

Sirs:

You wanted Kennedy and you got him, with LBJ for an encore. This makes 1960 the year the liberals were sold down the river, and in your own quaint fashion you did your bit. Please cancel my subscription. *Hans Ury*
Berkeley, California

Sirs:

I think we should offer congratulations to Paul Butler and the rest of his mutton-headed political hacks who nominated the team most likely to put Tricky Dick in the White House. . . . Our only hope now, to escape oblivion, is that Nelson Rockefeller will fight for and win the Republican nomination.

Eileen Osborne
Montebello, California

Sirs:

I hope you are happy. If only a few delegates had stood fast (*e.g.* Governor Lawrence) we could have had Adlai. If the Republicans have the guts to nominate Rockefeller, they will carry every state outside of the South except Massachusetts. *John William Warnock, Jr.*
Takoma Park, Maryland

Sirs:

There are thousands of Democrats, I presume – and I am one of them – who can't see Kennedy even with a telescope and will, therefore, vote Republican. He stacked the cards and no one was allowed to cut the deck. Then he polished off the Southerners by taking them for a sleigh ride with Johnson! I'm switching over to the Republican Party early so as to avoid the big rush.

C. D. Phoebus
Irvington, New Jersey

Sirs:

What took place in Los Angeles this past week very strongly reminds me of what happened in Germany in the early days of Hitler's rise to power. And you had a part in that frightening spectacle. *Clare Israel*
Cincinnati, Ohio

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